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Chapter 1
Main Introduction
A global human society based on poverty for many and prosperity for a few, characterised
by islands of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty, is unsustainable.
Thabo Mbeki, World Summit for Sustainable Development, 2002
You can easily find people who are ten times as rich at sixty as they were at twenty; but
not one of them will tell you that they are ten times as happy.
George Bernard Shaw, 1928
Inequality, rather than want, is the cause of trouble.
Ancient Chinese saying
The relevance of distributional issues in the field of economics becomes evident as the
subject has been on the research agenda since many years, even if research intensity
varied to some extent in the past. There is of course a well-founded intrinsic motivation
to understand the determinants of income distribution, but studies related to the field
focus predominantly on the role a given distribution has on other economic phenomena or
mechanisms (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000).1 The debate on how income inequality
affects economic growth fits well in with this. Especially the 1990s have seen both the
development of new theoretical models and comprehensive empirical analyses to gain new
insights helping to answer these old questions and to outline the scope for policy (e.g.
Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999; Benabou, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994;
Persson and Tabellini, 1994).
1Kuznets (1955) basically started a profound analysis of the secular structure of income distribution.
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During the last decade, the interest also centred again on the implications income
inequality has on well-being. Not least because of recent discussions of globalisation and
its impact on within-country and between-country inequality, these issues come back to the
fore (e.g. Wade, 2002; Melchior, Telle, and Wiig, 2000). Theoretical work on inequality and
welfare can be traced back to Graaf (1957). Since then, a literature developed convincingly
arguing that a more unequal distribution of income, ceteris paribus, reduces aggregate
welfare (e.g. Rawls, 1971; Hirsch, 1977; Sen, 1982). Indicators of economic welfare that in
addition to the mean income also consider the distribution of it have been proposed by e.g.
Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973), and Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974). So far, a few studies have
applied some of these inequality-adjusted measures to real data to reassess the welfare
level of particular countries (e.g. Klasen, 1994; Jenkins, 1997; Grün and Klasen, 2001).
Part I of the present work belongs to this field of study. In contrast to previous studies,
the scope of analysis comprises not only particular countries, but aims at international and
intertemporal comparisons as well as a global assessment of well-being.2 As today rich data
sets on both average incomes and income inequality are available, it seems natural to apply
these data to welfare measures that combine mean income and its distribution. Theory
suggests several ways how inequality can be incorporated into a measure of welfare. As the
empirical analysis will show, the resulting levels of welfare respond to these differences.
Furthermore, some measures allow to vary the penalty associated with a given unequal
distribution of income. This way, it is possible to detect how different degrees of inequality
aversion affect the level of aggregate welfare.
Cross-country comparisons of well-being are still almost exclusively based on a measure
of average income, like GNP per capita. In the context of utilitarian welfare economics,
strong assumptions are necessary to justify this approach. Income inequality is either
’assumed away’ or an optimal distribution of income is supposed. To prove that these
assumptions entail a misleading view of aggregate welfare is the aim of the international
analysis. A comparison between inequality-adjusted measures and unadjusted average
incomes will demonstrate what impact the inclusion of income inequality has on the
assessment of a country’s welfare level.
The question whether income inequality systematically changes over time also attracts
attention from time to time. In the context discussed here, it corresponds to whether the
impression of welfare changes would be different once the change in inequality is also taken
into account. To arrive at assured results, the intertemporal analysis will investigate the
subject via econometric methods applied to the total sample of countries as well as detailed
analysis of selected countries.
2Please note that I will be concerned with the economic dimension of inequality and well-being only.
Furthermore, only the dispersion of income and not wealth will be considered.
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Such welfare comparisons across time are focused on conditions prevailing within par-
ticular countries. It is, however, well-known that income inequality between countries is
considerably larger. Abstracting from regional boundaries leads to the concept of global
inequality which refers to income inequality between all people regardless where they
live (Lundberg and Milanovic, 2000). In the concluding global analysis I try to explore
how global welfare changed during the last 30 years and what role the change of global
inequality played.
Going back to the concept of within-country inequality, the distribution of income
in South Africa is found to be exceptionally dispersed. Apartheid ruled for more than
40 years and left the country in a socially and economically segmented state. During
Apartheid, the labour market - normally a major source of acquiring means - was heav-
ily regulated in favour of Whites and contributed to the emergence and establishment
of a racial wage hierarchy which persists until today. Part II of this work is devoted to
a comprehensive analysis of labour market outcomes in the post-Apartheid period. In
contrast to previous studies which determined the extent of labour market discrimination
using the standard decomposition approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973), I will apply
a decomposition technique suggested by Mavromaras (2003) and Neuman and Oaxaca
(1998). By jointly considering the probability of finding employment and the wage de-
termination process, it is possible to determine indirect effects of wage discrimination
in addition. These effects already arise at the hiring stage but also influence the wage
rate. A comparison between the standard decomposition approach, detecting only direct
wage discrimination, and the selectivity corrected approach allows to assess, whether the
appearance of wage discrimination changed over time and whether different population
groups have to contend with different kinds of discrimination.
Since 1994, the need to reduce disparities in earnings, employment, and occupations
has been addressed explicitly by the new South African legislation. In the context of the
South African labour market the focus of the public is predominantly on racial inequality,
I will also examine gender differentials. As the results will show, women also suffer from
a substantial extent of direct wage discrimination, but partly face indirect effects as well.
Results on the extent of labour market discrimination obtained from both the stan-
dard method and the selectivity corrected approach are derived from a decomposition
of mean wage differentials. Any heterogeneity among individuals is thereby disregarded.
Furthermore, the data used in the decomposition analysis are repeated cross sections,
allowing a detailed snapshot of labour market conditions and outcomes but the study of
temporal changes at an individual level is not possible. The analysis in Part III tries to
overcome the static nature of cross sectional data. With the help of cohort techniques,
several survey years can be linked to follow not individuals but birth cohorts over time.
9
This allows to break down some of the findings of Part II to a disaggregated level using
substantially more information that is provided by the data. In particular, group specific
mean wages can be split up into several age groups revealing their contribution to the
overall average. Inspecting socioeconomic characteristics related to the studies on labour
market outcomes point out important differences both between race and gender and young
and old people. Wage differentials determined in Part II can also be analysed at a cohort
level. As cohorts are followed over time, it is furthermore possible to watch their earn-
ings mobility. The comparison of within cohort changes will show whether young and old
cohorts develop alongside similar paths. Finally, as different birth cohorts are observed
at the same age, I will attempt to separate life-cycle from generational effects regarding
the earnings of African workers. The results regarding the cohort effects are partly unex-
pected, but particular labour market conditions as well as the overall performance of the
South African economy might help to explain it. However, to arrive at assured results,
further investigation is needed.
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Part I
Growth, Income Distribution, and
Well-Being: Comparisons across
Time and Space
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Chapter 2
The Theory of Well-Being and
Real-Income Comparisons
2.1 Introductory Remarks
Despite its well-known short-comings, GNP per capita is still the most widely used in-
dicator for comparisons of well-being across countries; and the per capita growth rate is
still the most common indicator of changes in well-being.1
The exclusive reliance on this measure is largely due to pragmatic grounds. GNP as
well as GDP are important measures of production possibility and business cycles. Hence,
great efforts are made to measure them timely, accurately, and according to internationally
agreed standards. With these data readily available, it is tempting to rely on them for
international and intertemporal comparisons of well-being. Moreover, it is argued by many
that GNP per capita and growth of per capita income is still the best available proxy for
changes in well-being as it is highly correlated with more complete or more broad-based
measures of well-being (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Ravallion, 1997).
Nevertheless, it continues to be the case that its neglect of income distribution is
one of the most serious short-comings of GNP as an indicator of welfare. In particular,
a broad range of philosophical approaches to the measurement of welfare (ranging from
utilitarianism with some very reasonable assumptions about utility functions to Rawlsian
reasoning or Sen’s capability approach) would suggest that, ceteris paribus, high economic
inequality reduces aggregate well-being. In fact, there exists a range of measures for well-
being that make use of this insight and combine mean income with some measure of
income inequality to arrive at better measures of welfare than average income alone (e.g.
Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1973; Dagum, 1990; Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974).
1There are other indicators, such as the Human Development Index and related measures, that have
attempted to generate alternatives to this exclusive reliance on income, but they have been criticised
for their choice of indicators, aggregation rules, and their neglect of distribution of the achievements
considered (see Srinivasan, 1994; Ravallion, 1997).
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In the past the application of those measures was limited, mainly because of lack
of data on income distribution. Recent years, however, have seen great advances being
made in the generation of data on income inequality (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1996;
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; WIID, 2000). Thus it seems natural to apply well-being
measures that combine GNP per capita and income distribution to these new data and
investigate to what extent these measures will generate comparisons of well-being across
space and time that are substantially different from pure per capita income comparisons.
This exercise is the purpose of Part I.
The following analysis itself consists of three major parts. As a preliminary step,
income inequality-adjusted welfare levels are calculated using various measures for as
many countries as possible in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1998. In the international
analysis countries are ranked according to their welfare level in both pure income based
measures and inequality-adjusted welfare indicators. A comparison of country specific
levels of well-being will demonstrate by how much aggregate welfare in a particular country
is reduced once the unequal distribution of its income is taken into account. Looking at
the welfare ranks, winners and losers can be detected, i.e. some countries will reach a
higher welfare rank than their income rank and vice versa. As a time span of almost
40 years is covered, it is also possible to assess changes in well-being. The intertemporal
analysis addresses the question whether or not the received impression of welfare changes
differs across the various measures. Finally, the global analysis tries to find out how global
welfare changed during the last 30 years.
It should be pointed out at the start that this study presents results of an exercise that,
to some degree, is still speculative. On the theoretical side, I am not aiming to propose
definitive measures of well-being. Instead, I merely wish to illustrate how reasonable ways
of incorporating inequality in an assessment of well-being will change the impression
of well-being across space and time. On the empirical front, the conclusions should be
seen as similarly tentative. While today many more data on income inequality across
space and time are available, the accuracy and comparability of many of them remains
a huge problem (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; Deininger and Squire, 1996). The
robustness of the results will be verified by some sensitivity analyses, i.e. using possibly
better data available for some points in time in a limited number of countries and using
regression-based adjustments. None of this can substitute for long consistent time series
of internationally standardised and comparable data which are at present not available.
Moreover, the international comparisons of inequality are limited to a small number of
countries in the early years considered (1960, 1970) so that it is difficult to say much
about temporal trends in inequality and well-being in many countries. And even for these
countries only very irregular data points on inequality are available so it is hardly possible
to talk about consistent time series. Finally, the ’global’ analysis is restricted to some 80
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per cent of the world’s population, and the 20 per cent excluded are clearly not a random
sample. To achieve such good coverage and include the most populous African countries
as well, somewhat heroic assumptions were necessary in addition, as reasonable data were
only available for circa 76 per cent of the world’s population in 1998. Despite these short-
comings, the analysis generates a number of important and usable findings that should
be fairly robust to most of the many data problems I encountered.
2.2 The Theoretical Approach
Despite a long history, the theory of welfare judgements across space and time continues
to be beset with conceptual and practical problems. Ever since it became evident that
social choice theory was not yielding acceptable2 procedures for making social welfare
judgements, such judgements have been based on axiomatic approaches to welfare mea-
surement. Those are based on a conceptualisation of what constitutes welfare and then the
derivation of an indicator that, under certain stated assumptions, can adequately measure
the chosen concept.
Applying such measures to welfare comparisons across space and time generate ad-
ditional problems. Those are discussed in detail in Sen (1982, 1984) and will only be
summarised here. In particular, the theory of welfare comparisons is based on situational
comparisons, i.e. whether a person would hypothetically prefer situation A to B. This com-
parison thus takes place at the same time and is done by the same person. Intertemporal
or international welfare comparisons, however, address different questions. Intertemporal
comparisons have to contend with the problem that the persons are not evaluating the
welfare of two situations simultaneously, but sequentially. This may generate problems if
overall perceptions of welfare or tastes have changed over time (in addition to the problem
that not all the people are alive in both periods). Comparisons across space, as done in
inter-country comparisons, are even more difficult as now the persons differ whose wel-
fare is being compared.3 The comparison could be made using the price (or other welfare
weight) vectors of either country, which would not necessarily generate the same result. In
addition to this theoretical problem, the comparability of prices poses another problem,
namely the appropriate exchange rate for international comparisons. In the past, most
real income comparisons were based on official exchange rates despite the knowledge that
2Acceptable is meant in the sense of obeying minimal requirements such as the four conditions stated
by Arrow in his famous impossibility result (Arrow, 1963). See also Sen (1973, 1999) for a discussion.
3One could try to translate an international comparison into a situational comparison, i.e. asking the
British whether they would prefer to live in Britain this year or in France this year. But this also leads to
considerable problems, as it is not clear which British person should compare themselves to which French
person, or whose welfare function should be used. For a discussion of those issues, see Sen (1982, 1984).
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they are often distorted as a result of speculation and currency restrictions, and that they
imply a systematic undervaluation of the non-traded sector in poorer countries. In recent
years, the International Comparison Programme (ICP)4 has generated purchasing power
parity estimates of GDP and GNP based on international prices that try to address these
particular short-comings.5
Thus, there are some important conceptual questions that relate to such comparisons.
Only if one places restrictions on intertemporal changes and international differences in
preferences, these comparisons can yield meaningful outcomes. Given the ubiquity of such
comparisons, it appears that most analysts are willing to make such assumptions.
The most commonly used indicator for welfare comparisons across space and time
is real per capita income.6 It can be derived from utilitarian welfare economics using
three alternative sets of assumptions. One set would demand everyone to have identical
unchanging cardinal utility functions where income (or consumption)7 enters the utility
function linearly (e.g. in the simplest form, every unit of consumption generates one unit
of utility). An alternative set of assumptions could allow for more realistic concave utility
functions, but would still require identical utility functions and require in addition that
everyone is earning the per capita income and thus consumes the mean commodity bun-
dle (Sen, 1984). A third set is based on Samuelson (1947) and takes an ’individualistic
approach’ to welfare measurement. Under this approach, social welfare is recovered from
individual welfare based on revealed preferences using the Pareto principle. If preferences
are complete, convex, and monotonically increasing, if each person’s welfare only depends
on her purchases (i.e. no externalities and public goods), if there are no market imperfec-
tions on the buyer’s side, and if each person is rational in the sense that her choices reflect
her welfare ranking, then the ratio of market prices should equal the ratio of intra-personal
weights (marginal rates of substitution) attached to these goods. These assumptions are
not sufficient, however, to ensure that the market prices say anything about the valuation
of a good going to two different people, as this requires interpersonal comparisons. To
4The ICP produces estimates of the economies’ main aggregates which are comparable across countries.
Purchasing power parities are generated and used for converting the data into a common currency (UN,
1992). Unfortunately, not all countries participate in the project. Most notably, the lack of reliable PPP
conversion factor for China that never took part and India with the latest PPP estimates stemming from
1985 may limit international comparability.
5While the data generated by these methods are widely used, they are not beyond question. In partic-
ular, the resulting adjusted per capita incomes are sensitive to the choice of ’international prices’ which
is closer to the prices prevailing in rich countries (Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991; Hill, 2000).
Moreover, as chapter 3.2 reveals, PPP adjustments can differ in their outcomes as the differences be-
tween the World Bank estimates and the Penn World Tables demonstrate. For a critical assessment of
the concept and current use of PPP in the context of poverty measurement see Reddy and Pogge (2002).
6There are well-known omissions and distortions of GNP as a measure of the value created in an
economy. These issues will not be discussed further here.
7I abstract from the difficulties associated with the treatment of saving in an indicator of welfare. For
a discussion, see Osberg and Sharpe (2002).
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be able to make such interpersonal comparisons, which are necessary for all real income
comparisons, one has to assume in addition that the income distribution is ’optimal’ in
the sense that the ethical worth of each person’s marginal dollar is equal (Samuelson,
1947).
All three sets of assumptions are problematic. While many aspects of the various
approaches appear unrealistic, the need to explicitly ignore the distribution of income in
a welfare comparison is particularly unpalatable. Ignoring income distribution through
the assumption of linear utility functions, through the assumption of everyone having the
same income, or through the assumption of income distribution being ’optimal’ from a
welfare point of view is all equally debatable. In fact, both theoretical considerations (e.g.
declining marginal utility of income derived from convex preferences) as well as empirical
observations (e.g. about risk aversion and insurance as well as subjective well-being)
clearly suggest that neither utility functions are linear in income or consumption, nor
that the existing distribution of incomes is ’optimal’ from a social welfare point of view.8
Instead, these theoretical and empirical considerations point to concave utility functions,
i.e. inequality reduces aggregate welfare as the marginal utility of income among the poor
is much higher than among the rich.9
Non-utilitarian views of welfare would also suggest that income inequality reduces
aggregate well-being. For example, Sen’s capability approach (Sen, 1987) which calls for
a maximisation of people’s capability to function (e.g. the capability to be healthy, well-
nourished, adequately housed, etc.) also exhibits declining marginal returns in the income
space.10 Similarly, application of Rawlsian principles would also suggest that welfare is
higher in societies where inequality is lower (Rawls, 1971).11
One approach to improve upon the welfare content of real income comparisons is
therefore to jettison this neglect of income distribution and incorporate the notion of
declining marginal welfare returns of income. Each of the measures proposed in the next
chapter does precisely this in slightly different ways.
8See for example Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2002) who show with the help of U.S. happiness
data and the Euro-Barometer Survey Series that income inequality negatively affects the utility level
of individuals, even though personal characteristics like individual income are controlled for. They also
point to unexpected differences across population groups and regions. For example, the poor in Europe
and the rich in America exhibit greater aversion to inequality than other income groups. The authors
argue that the different degree of social mobility contributes to this outcome, though these differences
may be rather perceived than realistic.
9This is inherent also in the approach by Graaf (1957) and Sen (1982) who treat the same good going
to two different people as two different goods and thus explicitly do away with the distinction between
size and distribution of income as the ’welfare depends on them both’ (Sen, 1982).
10For example, there appears to be a concave relationship between income and life expectancy, and
income and educational achievement. For a discussion, see Klasen (1994).
11In the lexicographic version of the maximin principle, only the position of the worst off is relevant; if
one generalises a bit, one would get a more continuous declining marginal valuation of income. Similarly,
Hirsch’s views on the social limits to growth also imply declining aggregate well-being as a result of
inequality. For details see Hirsch (1977) and Klasen (1994).
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Before turning to this issue, however, it seems useful to consider one explicit objection
to the incorporation of distributional issues in an assessment of well-being. It could be
argued that higher inequality will lead to higher growth rates.12 Redistributive policies
may then distort incentives to invest as they are often realised in terms of disproportion-
ate taxation of property growth. This would suggest that there is a trade-off between
higher well-being associated with today’s lower inequality and lower well-being associated
with the subsequently reduced economic growth. While such dynamic considerations go
beyond the scope of this analysis and would, in any case, require the inclusion of other
dynamic issues (e.g. the role of savings and of depreciation of human, natural, and phys-
ical capital in long-term well-being of nations)13, there is a growing consensus that this
trade-off between distribution and growth does not exist. In fact, if anything, the de-
bate has recently shifted in the opposite direction suggesting that initial inequality lowers
subsequent growth prospects rather than increases them (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998;
Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Klasen, 2002). While
these findings are still tentative and subject to some debate14, they suggest that the older
claim, that high inequality is necessary for growth, does not seem to be born out by the
facts (see also Klasen, 1994).
2.3 The Well-Being Measures Used
This section describes some measures that jointly consider per capita income and its dis-
tribution and therefore avoid the particularly problematic neglect of income distribution
in a consideration of welfare. Most are well-known in the inequality literature although
not all of them have been used explicitly for aggregate welfare comparisons. All share the
feature that they can be summarised by the following formula:
W = µ(1− I), 0 ≤ I ≤ 1. (2.1)
Welfare W is a function of mean income µ, reduced by a measure of inequality I. Thus,
the existing degree of inequality adjusts mean income downward to reflect the welfare loss
12Assuming a Keynesian consumption function, a more unequal distribution of income leads to higher
aggregate savings which is one of the main determinants in any growth model.
13One might also want to consider longevity in conjunction with income and income inequality to
measure how long people are able to enjoy their incomes. For a discussion, see Berry, Bourguignon, and
Morrison (1991).
14See, for example, Forbes (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (1999). The last-named regard growth and
income inequality as jointly determined rather than one causing the other; they also find that inequality
is particularly bad for income growth among the poor, while it has a different effect for income growth
among the rich.
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associated with the (unequal) distribution of that mean income. Several measures will be
considered because there are on the one hand differences with respect to the intensity of
’welfare penalty’ that is imposed. On the other hand the measures vary in the way they
penalise different types of inequality.
The first measure considered here was proposed by Sen (1982) and incorporates in-
equality by using the Gini coefficient G:
S = µ(1−G). (2.2)
The Sen measure can be derived by replacing Samuelson’s problematic ’optimal distri-
bution’ assumption by the assumption of ’rank order weighting’ (Sen, 1973). Individual
incomes will be weighted according to their rank in the income distribution (with the
richest person receiving rank 1 and thus the lowest weight for her income). It can also be
derived from a utility function where individuals consider not only their own income, but
the entire income distribution, with particular emphasis on the number of people with
incomes below or above one’s own (Dagum, 1990). Thus, preferences are assumed to be
interdependent which accords well with recent empirical findings (e.g. Easterlin, 1995;
Banerjee, 1997).
A variant of this measure was proposed by Dagum (1990):
D =
µ(1−G)
1 + G
= µ(1− 2G
1 + G
). (2.3)
Clearly, the Dagum measure is a more extreme version of the Sen measure as it results in
a higher penalty because of the denominator which imposes an additional punishment for
inequality. The Dagum measure is also based on interdependent preferences and implies
that people receive a further welfare penalty from the people ahead of them in the income
distribution which also appears to be a reasonable assumption.15
In addition, two versions of the Atkinson welfare measure are presented. The Atkinson
measure was developed as an indicator of inequality that explicitly considers the welfare
loss associated with inequality in the measure (Atkinson, 1970). But one can equally well
just use the way the welfare loss is calculated, the equally distributed equivalent income,
as the welfare measure itself.16 This equally distributed equivalent income is the amount
of income that, if distributed equally, would yield the same welfare as the actual mean
income and its present (unequal) distribution (Deaton, 1997). The general form of this
15See Dagum (1990) for a derivation and justification of this measure.
16This has been done, for example, for Britain by Jenkins (1997) and also by UNDP in deriving the
gender-related development index (UNDP, 1995). For a discussion of this index, see Bardhan and Klasen
(1999).
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measure is given in equation (2.4):17
A2 =
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
x1−εi
] 1
1−ε
. (2.4)
The measure depends crucially on the exponent ε, the aversion to inequality factor. The
higher ε, the higher the penalty for inequality. Two cases are studied explicitly, ε = 2,
denoted as A2, and ε = 1 (A1). In the latter case, the general form of the Atkinson
measure is not defined and changes to:
ln(A1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln(xi). (2.5)
The Atkinson measures can be derived from social welfare functions that are additively
separable functions of individual incomes. Thus they are based on individualistic utility
functions where people only care about their own incomes. Inequality reduces welfare in
this formulation as the utility functions considered are concave for all ε > 0. All the
measures exhibit constant relative risk aversion. The ε = 1 has the additional property of
being based on a constant elasticity utility function, suggesting that a percentage increase
in income is valued the same regardless of its recipient. Such an assumption has quite a lot
of intuitive appeal. While clearly ε = 2 penalises inequality more than ε = 1 and is thus
based on declining elasticity of income, the underlying assumption, that at twice the level
of income, a percentage increase in income is valued half as much as at the lower level
of income, also appears to be within the range of reasonable presumptions (see Deaton,
1997; UNDP, 1995). Such penalties of inequality are still consistent with findings from
the micro literature on utility and risk.18 Most of the non-utilitarian theories suggested
above would, in fact, require considerably higher inequality aversion.19
A third set of measures were proposed by Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) which pre-
sented measures that combine income growth with redistribution. In particular, they
suggested a measure which they called a population-weighted or equal-weighted growth
rate which is simply the arithmetic average of the growth rates of each individual. Instead
17This measure also satisfies the general form of the well-being measure W = µ(1−I) where I = 1−Aµ .
See Atkinson (1970) for discussion.
18Using data from Poland and the Soviet Union, Stodder (1991) estimates upper and lower bounds
of the aversion to inequality parameter and arrives at 1 < ε < 3. A recent study on measuring in-
equality aversion of individuals was conducted by Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999). With the help of
the leaky-bucket experiment they examine to what extent students from Australia and Israel tolerate
income inequality. They found surprisingly low aversion to inequality factors (ε ≈ 0.25), but also regional
differences. Furthermore, they acknowledge that the results may not be applicable to other population
groups.
19A strict interpretation of Rawls lexicographic maximin principle would require ε to be infinite (see
also Atkinson, 1970).
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of treating a dollar increase the same regardless of its recipient, this measure treats a per-
centage increase the same, thus also allowing for declining marginal utility of income and
exhibiting what they called the ’one person, one vote’ principle of growth measurement.
It turns out that this measure is a small-number approximation of the Atkinson ε = 1
measure, which also weights a percentage increase the same regardless of its recipient.20
Thus, it will not be reported separately here. But the similarity between this measure and
the Atkinson measure gives another justification for the Atkinson measure.
Similarly, their second growth measure, the welfare or poverty-weighted growth rate
(which gives greater weight to income increases of the poor than the rich) is a discrete
approximation of a version of the Atkinson with ε > 1. The Atkinson measure with ε = 2
measure will therefore yield very similar results.
Before turning to the data and the results, it is important to briefly discuss the most
important differences between the measures.21 Apart from the penalty applied to in-
equality, the two Gini-based measures differ quite fundamentally from the two Atkinson
measures (and thus the Ahluwalia and Chenery measures) in ways that are important
to consider. Firstly, the two sets of measures respond differently to equal-sized income
transfers at different points in the income distribution. While all measures are consistent
with the Dalton principle of transfers22, the Atkinson measures obey what has been called
transfer sensitivity. An equal-sized transfer will have a larger impact on inequality (and
thus on welfare) if it happens among the poorer sections of the income distribution than
if it happens among richer sections (Sen, 1997). Most would agree that this is a desir-
able property. In contrast, the largest impact of an equal-sized transfer using the Gini
coefficient will be among the mode of the income distribution, i.e. among middle income
groups. The difference occurs as these transfers will have the largest impact on the rank
of the people affected by the transfer and thus the weights attached to their incomes
(see Atkinson, 1970; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978). Given, income comparisons with
others are very important, shifts in income which have a large impact on the ranking
should clearly be weighed heavily.23 But it seems that many analysts see this as a rather
20It can be shown that the growth in the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 is simply the geometric mean
of the growth rates of individuals (or quintiles, depending on the unit of disaggregation), while the
population or equal weights measure is the arithmetic mean of the growth rates. For small numbers, one
is an approximation of the other. See Klasen (1994) for a discussion and application of the Ahluwalia and
Chenery measures.
21For a more extensive discussion of these issues, refer to Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson
(1978), and Dagum (1990).
22The Dalton principle of transfers says that the value of an inequality measure must fall by a transfer
from a richer person to a poorer person which does not reverse their position in the income ranking.
23For a recent study on these issues, see for example Graham and Pettinato (2002). Analysing data from
Peru (covering the period 1985-2000) and Russia (1995-1998), they found that relative income differences
seem to matter more for those in the middle of the distribution than for other income groups.
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undesirably attribute of the Gini-based measures (e.g. Atkinson, 1970).24
The second major difference relates to the behaviour of the overall measure if only
parts of the population are affected by any changes. The Atkinson measures are sub-
group consistent and thus imply that any increase in the income of a sub-group (or a
reduction in inequality of that sub-group) will, ceteris paribus, raise aggregate welfare.
In contrast, an increase of income accruing to the richest could actually lower aggregate
welfare in the Gini-based measures as the increase in mean income can be more than
off-set by the increase in inequality.25 Some see this as an argument in favour of the
Gini-based measures (e.g. Sen, 1997; Dagum, 1990), others see subgroup consistency as a
valuable criterion. In the context of this work, it will suffice to note that the Gini-based
measures penalise inequality more if middle income groups are hurt the most, while the
Atkinson measure will penalise more if the poorest are hurt the most by it.
24Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999) compare alternative specifications of a social welfare function and
conclude that a Gini based function yields a better fit of the regression.
25See Dagum (1990) for examples. This difference only appears if inequality is much more extreme than
the types of inequality existing in today’s world.
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Chapter 3
The Comparison of Well-Being
across Time and Space
3.1 Description of Data Sources
For both components of the measures, data on mean income and inequality, there are
several options. For the following analysis, the main source of data on inequality is the
World Income Inequality Database version 1.0 (WIID, 2000), which provides more than
5.000 Gini coefficients and associated distributions for 151 countries. The main sources
used for assembling the data set were the Deininger-Squire data (Deininger and Squire,
1996), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2000), the TransMonee Project (TransMonee,
1999) as well as other research studies and information provided by various Central Sta-
tistical Offices. To get recent data for developing countries as well as some OECD coun-
tries, Gini coefficients and income shares published by the World Bank’s Poverty Monitor
(World Bank, 2002) and directly provided by LIS are added.1 In WIID all observations
are classified as either ’reliable’ or ’less reliable’. Only observations which are categorised
as ’reliable’ and represent the entire population of a country are considered.2 With re-
spect to the underlying income concept, inequality data must be based on gross or net
income, or on expenditures. Regarding the unit of income recipient, data based on person
(or household per capita), or households are chosen. Only for few countries the analysis
1My special thanks go to David Jesuit and Tim Smeeding for kindly providing the most recent data
of several OECD countries.
2The quality of income inequality data provided by Deininger and Squire (1996) was already evaluated
by them. If the data satisfy a minimum standard, i.e. they are based on household surveys, representative
of the entire country, and a comprehensive concept of income (or expenditure) is used, they are included
in the so-called ’high quality’ set. Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), however, warn of the ’mechanical use’
of the data. In WIID, data have been scrutinised one by one once again and the quality of the data was
sometimes rated differently. Therefore, it happens that data classified as ’not accepted’ and therefore
not contained in the quality subset of Deininger-Squire are part of the ’reliable data set’ in WIID. The
opposite, that data belonging to the quality set but are categorised as ’not reliable’ in WIID, is also
possible.
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has to rely on data that either have been adjusted for household composition using an
equivalence scale or where the income concept used and the reference unit are unknown.3
In the case where several Gini coefficients with associated distributions were available
for a particular country at a particular point in time, that observation allowing to base
inequality data on the same or similar specification across time was chosen.
Ideally, one would want to at least ensure that the indicators used are based on a con-
sistent definition of income and reference unit both across countries and time.4 Pursuing
this strategy would result in only a small number of countries and not allow a meaningful
international analysis. While the main analysis deals with differing income concepts and
reference units, in the sensitivity analysis, I try to generate consistent data by making
suitable adjustments to base all data on unequivalized gross income per person.
Although WIID is probably the most comprehensive source on data on inequality, data
for the early years in the analysis are rare and some adjustments were necessary. In case
there is no Gini coefficient and associated income shares for the particular point in time,
the nearest available data is used for calculation. Despite these adjustments the samples
of countries to which all measures can be applied are still quite limited. Table 3.1 shows
the different years of available data on income distribution that have been chosen for the
years 1960-1998. The greatest concessions had to be made for less developed countries like
Pakistan, Panama and Chile in 1960, or for Nepal, Indonesia and Singapore in 1970. But
also in case of developed countries like Finland in 1960 and 1970, or Belgium and Italy
in 1970 the inequality data come from considerably later periods. For 1998, the latest
available income distribution estimate has been applied which in a few cases date as far
back as 1990 or 1991, but in most cases comes from the period 1993 to 1997.5
Regarding income data one could consider per capita income, per capita disposable
income, or per capita consumption. To make the analysis comparable to international
comparisons of per capita income and to get the largest possible sample, I rely on per
capita gross national product6 as presented in the national accounts as the income concept
used.7 The calculation of the well-being measures is based on purchasing power adjusted
3For a discussion of the use of equivalence scales in the context of welfare measurement, please refer
to Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995), Deaton (1997), and Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta
(2001).
4Even if Gini coefficients are based on the same definition of income and economic unit they might
not be comparable across countries, because of differences in sample methods, quality of surveys etc. (see
WIID, 2000).
5In nearly all cases, the exact year for the income estimate is used under the (implicit) assumption
that changes in income distribution between adjacent years are typically smaller than changes in mean
income. Given positive average real income growth present in almost all countries which would bias
income comparisons from different years, this assumption appears reasonable.
6Gross national product should better capture welfare of the population than gross domestic product
as the former includes earnings from abroad and excludes earnings by foreigners.
7There are basically two reasons why national account data instead of survey means are used. Firstly,
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income data provided by the Penn World Table (PWT), versions 6.0 and 5.6 (Heston,
Summers, and Aten, 2001; Summers and Heston, 1991).8 In addition, data on GNP per
capita based on official exchange rates from the World Bank for all years as well as the
World Bank’s purchasing power adjusted income data9 for the years 1980, 1990, and 1998
(WDI, 1999, 2001, 2002) will be presented for comparison.
In the sensitivity analyses, the data used will be replaced with alternative estimates
which either differ in the definition of income and/or reference unit or were provided by
another data source. Moreover, I estimate fixed effects panel regressions to try to address
the inconsistent treatment of the reference unit and the income concept, applying similar
procedures as used by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Lundberg and Squire (1999). Using
the regression-based adjustments, all observations are based on gross income per person.
For the calculation of global well-being and changes thereof between 1970 and 1998,
I start by using a sub sample which consists of 72 countries representing 81 per cent
percent of the world population in 1998. In order to reach such coverage and include some
of the populous and high population growth African and Middle Eastern countries, it was
necessary to assume in some cases that income inequality remained stable throughout
the period studied and only income growth changed, as more data are available on the
latter than the former.10 However, the main analysis disregards many of the formerly
socialist countries since the PWT do not provide sufficient information to calculate PPP
adjusted per capita income for this group of countries in the given period. Since many
the latter are only available for recent years, hence, neither allowing the time frame nor the regional
coverage of the present analysis. Secondly, the inequality-adjusted measures will be placed alongside the
income per capita figures to reveal the existent differences. The drawback of relying on national account
data is that the results obtained here are not comparable to those of similar studies based on survey data
(e.g. Milanovic, 2002; Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta, 2001).
8The PWT 6.0 series dealt with is real per capita GDP, chain method (1996 prices) which is turned
to GNP per capita using a series that relates current GNP to GDP (CGNP series). This series is only
included in version 5.6 and covers the period 1970-1992 for most countries. For the years 1960 and 1998,
numbers reported for the most adjacent years are adopted. Since for the vast majority of countries, GNP
and GDP are of similar magnitude and country specific ratios of both income measures are relatively
constant over time, these manipulations should not cause major problems. A comparison with the latest
release of PWT 6.1 which includes an update of the CGNP series covering the time span 1960-2000,
’justifies’ this approach as well.
9The series used is GNI per capita, PPP in current international dollars. Gross national income is the
”sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income [...] from abroad” (WDI, 2002). All data taken
from the World Bank were deflated to 1996 prices using the US GDP deflator (WDI, 2002) as this is the
base year in PWT 6.0.
10This way, all countries shown in Table 3.1 with at least two observations on inequality between 1970
and 1998 are included, except for Bulgaria (no income data in 1970 and 1980 available) and Sierra Leone
(civil war in the early 1990’s). The assumption of stability of income distribution is, especially when
compared to huge variations and changes in income growth levels, reasonable as will be shown below and
as has been found by others (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 1999). Of the world’s
40 most populous countries in 1998 all except Russia, Germany, Vietnam, Iran, Ukraine, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Argentina, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan are considered.
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of them experienced a considerable worsening in income inequality during the transition
period (Milanovic, 1998; Grün and Klasen, 2001), ignoring them in a global analysis
of well-being may yield flawed results. Therefore, I expand the sample by 15 Eastern
European countries and successor states of the Soviet Union, covering now 86 per cent
of the world population, and make a second analysis of global well-being for the years
1988 and 1998 by using GNI per capita in PPP terms provided by WDI (2002).11 For
both samples I calculated average income per quintile for each country, sorted them in
ascending order to generate global income quintiles, and then calculated average incomes
of these world quintiles based on the population-weighted country quintiles contained in
each world quintile.12 These computations result in average incomes per ’world quintile’
which are applied to the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 and ε = 2.
3.2 Well-Being Comparisons
3.2.1 International Analysis
Table 3.2 presents the analysis for 1960 based on the six measures used. The first two
measures are per capita income, using exchange rates and PPP, respectively. The next two
are the Atkinson measure with ε = 1 and the Sen measure, exhibiting a comparatively
’mild’ well-being penalty for inequality. The last two are the Atkinson (ε = 2) and the
Dagum measures with a more heavy implied well-being penalty for inequality. The analysis
is restricted to only 43 countries. Since they cover a wide spectrum of incomes, big changes
in ranks can only happen when there are very drastic differences between the measures.
Well-being, as estimated by the various measures, falls drastically when considering
inequality. Using the Atkinson (ε = 1) or Sen measure, well-being falls by about 10-65 per
cent, and by 70 (Brazil and Mexico) to nearly 80 per cent (Gabon) in the Atkinson (ε = 2)
and Dagum measure. Compared to pure income per capita measures, existing inequality
leads to major reductions in measured well-being in all the countries considered.
As expected from the discussion of inequality-adjusted measures above, there are some
differences in the extent of ’penalty’ for inequality, depending on the measure used. For
example, Pakistan gets penalised less by the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure than the Sen
measure, while the reverse is the case for the Philippines. The reason is that in the
11In particular, I include Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Data on income
inequality for the pre-transition period are mainly taken from Milanovic (1998); for the year 1998 I again
rely on WIID (2000).
12When a country quintile straddles the line between two world quintiles, the country quintile was
proportionately allocated to ensure that the world quintiles contain equal population numbers.
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Philippines the poorest do particularly badly corresponding to a heavy penalty in the
Atkinson measure, while in Pakistan the middle income groups do relatively worse, which
attracts the higher penalty in the Gini-based measure.
In 1960, no assessment of inequality can dislodge the US from the highest rank in
all measures, and nothing can prevent Tanzania from being at the bottom of the list for
those indicators with data being available. But there are also a number of rank changes.
Firstly, there is a considerable difference between the ranks using exchange rate and
PPP, suggesting the presence of over- and undervalued exchange rates. As expected, the
discrepancy is larger among poorer countries, related to the undervaluation of the non-
traded sectors. Secondly, there are a number of remarkable rank reversals when inequality
is progressively being considered. For example, Bangladesh and Madagascar trade places
between the pure income and the broader well-being measures. In the two income measures
Madagascar is four ranks ahead; in the last two columns, Bangladesh is five ranks ahead.13
A similar reversal occurs, somewhat surprisingly, between Britain and Sweden. Sweden is
ahead in the pure income measures, while Britain is ahead in measures that also consider
distribution; in fact, it mostly occupies the second highest spot in this list. This suggests
that the very low inequality in Sweden was not already present in the 1960s, and the
rise of Britain reminds us that Britain was among the more equal countries in Europe in
1960.14
Table 3.3 shows the rankings for 48 countries in 1970. Again, there are large differences
between exchange rate based estimates of real incomes and PPP estimates, with the
discrepancy being largest among poorer countries. Considering inequality continues to
reduce well-being drastically. Once again, Brazil is one of the countries that lose most:
Well-being using the Dagum measure is 73 per cent below the level it would be if its per
capita income were equally distributed. The US remains on top in all measures except the
exchange rate adjusted income per capita measure, arguably the least reliable indicator of
well-being. At the bottom Nepal, Indonesia, and Sierra Leone vie for the worst spot. Some
more dramatic reversals in rank occur. Panama falls from number 25 in the exchange rate
list to number 41 in Atkinson (ε = 2) measure. Conversely, Sri Lanka rises from 16 ranks
below in the first column to one rank above Panama once inequality is considered in the
Atkinson (ε = 2) measure. Unequal Brazil trades places with more equal Korea, and now
Sweden maintains its rank when inequality is being considered, while Britain’s fall in the
income rank cannot be completely compensated by its still comparatively low inequality.
13Colombia is another country that also falls considerably, once PPP and inequality is considered.
14Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) also report fairly high income inequality in Sweden in the 1960s. In
the LIS, Sweden is found to be considerably more equal than Britain. Since the LIS does not go back that
far, it is hard to tell whether the reported higher inequality in the 1960s is due to measurement error or
true effects. See also the sensitivity analysis in the next chapter and Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).
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Table 3.4 examines 57 countries for 1980. There is one more indicator, PPP adjusted
income per capita from the World Bank (WDI, 2002), which is placed alongside the
data from the Penn World Tables. The comparison suggests that the PPP adjustment
is subject to some margin of error. For example, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand look somewhat richer in the PPP adjustment from the
Penn World Tables than in the adjustment done by the World Bank while the reverse
appears to be the case for several Latin American countries. Several rank changes happen
as a result of these differences in the PPP adjustments.
The inequality-adjusted measures continue to be much lower than the income mea-
sures. Brazil and Colombia continue to suffer from the largest reductions in well-being
which are also now larger than previously, suggesting not only high but worsening inequal-
ity. Due to rising inequality and catch-up growth, the US loses its top spot to Belgium
in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure.15 Britain still rises in the ranks when inequality is con-
sidered. Unequal Brazil and more equal Costa Rica now trade places; Brazil is two ranks
ahead in PWT PPP income (column 3), and Costa Rica is one to three places ahead in
the inequality-adjusted measures. Bangladesh, on the other hand, no longer improves its
position as much as before.16
Table 3.5 examines the per capita income and well-being in 70 countries in 1990.
The differences between the PWT and the World Bank PPP adjustments still exist, but
remain consistent in the sense that the differences in assessment in 1990 are largely the
same as for 1980. Well-being continues to be much lower than before; by and large, the
reduction appears to be similar to previous decades suggesting no general worsening (or
improvement) in income distribution.
Regarding rank reversals, Brazil and South Africa, two of the world’s most unequal
countries, get surpassed in the Atkinson measure (ε = 2) by Indonesia, a country 25 and
30 ranks, respectively, below in the income ranking with less than half the PPP income
per capita when compared to Brazil. That is to say, Brazil could generate the same level
of well-being with only half the income, if that income was as evenly distributed as it is
in Indonesia.
Low levels of income and sizeable income inequality assure that many African coun-
tries land at the bottom end in all measures. At the other end of the spectrum, the US
only retains the second spot in the PPP-adjusted income measures and the mildly pe-
nalizing inequality-adjusted measures. In the Dagum measure it is surpassed by Canada
and Luxembourg and, in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, additionally by Belgium and the
15The US loses especially in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure as the poorest are particularly badly off in
the US. See also Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000).
16This is due to somewhat higher observed inequality in 1980, which falls again in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. To what extent this data point is an aberration, is difficult to tell.
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Netherlands. This fall in ranks of the US is mostly due to rising inequality there, compared
to the other countries (rather than differences in average income growth). Clearly, people
in the US are paying a price in terms of well-being due to the higher inequality there
and other countries do not suffer from the same problem (see Klasen, 1994).17 Similarly,
higher inequality in Britain ensures that the country no longer rises in ranks and even
falls in some measures once inequality is considered.
Table 3.6 shows the well-being measures for 72 countries in 1998. At the bottom
end, we again find mostly African countries. Indonesia still improves in ranks and is
ahead of Peru in the Dagum and Atkinson (ε = 2) measures. Likewise, poorer Bulgaria
and richer Mexico trade places in two measures which also consider inequality. At the
top end, Luxembourg but also again the US lead the pack in most indicators. The US
gained strength since they experienced a substantial increase in income per capita and a
comparatively small change in income inequality compared with 1990. Rising inequality
in Canada is ensuring that it is falling further behind, being surpassed by some other
OECD countries in the Atkinson (ε = 2) and Dagum measures.
It is hard to summarise the many particular findings from this discussion. But a few
points are worth noting. Firstly, as expected real income comparisons based on official
exchange rates give a very misleading impression of well-being. In particular, they sys-
tematically understate well-being in developing countries. At the same time, there are
discrepancies between the two sets of available PPP estimates. Secondly, the considera-
tion of the income distribution has a large impact on well-being. Well-being falls by 15-75
per cent once inequality is taken into account. The comparison of welfare levels between
Indonesia and Brazil in Figure 3.1 is informative here. Relying on unadjusted income
measures, Brazil is far ahead of Indonesia in all years. But once inequality is considered
as well, Brazil’s welfare levels drop sharply and in 1998 Indonesia has not only closed
the gap but, according to the newly introduced Atkinson measure with ε = 5 reached a
slightly higher welfare level than Brazil. Thirdly, large differences in inequality between
countries lead to very large changes in rank. Brazil’s drop in rank is a very dramatic
illustration of this. Fourthly, changes in inequality have an important impact in some
countries, most notably the US and Britain. This is also illustrated in Figure 3.2 which
examines the welfare levels for the US and Canada between 1970 and 1990. While the
slopes of the curves for the US become steeper when going from 1970 to 1990 thereby
17Please note that these results differ from Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001) who, based on
micro data, find that the US is surpassed only by Belgium in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure, while Canada
and Sweden remain considerably worse off. The difference in findings is probably due to the fact that
the present analysis uses the mean (gross) income variable based on national accounts, while in Ayala,
Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001) mean income refers to disposable income based on adjusted micro
data. Other sources of differences could be the different PPP adjustments (PWT versus OECD PPP
adjustments), and differences in the Gini coefficients.
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indicating rising inequality which leads to lower welfare levels, Canada experiences de-
clining inequality and is thus able, according to some measures, to reach a higher welfare
level than the US in 1990.18 Fifthly, the combination of income growth as well as levels
and changes in inequality together can lead to very large differences in changes in well-
being. The comparison between Sri Lanka and Peru is instructive here (see Figure 3.3).
Sri Lanka combines comparatively low inequality with steady growth, Peru experienced
considerable fluctuations in its mean income with relatively high inequality. In 1998, de-
spite being still poorer in income than Peru, Sri Lanka has already a higher welfare level
in the Atkinson (ε = 2) measure and adds to this lead if ε = 5 is assumed. To assess
whether these findings are due to peculiarities and inconsistencies of the data chosen, a
sensitivity analysis is presented in the following.
3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The robustness of the results is verified with the help of two different approaches. Firstly,
I simply replace the data on income distribution used in the original analysis. Alternative
data which are either based on different income concepts and/or reference units or come
from a different data source are considered.19 For countries with such alternatives avail-
able, I replace the Gini coefficients and income shares, calculate the measures, rank the
countries again and compare the results with those obtained from the original analysis.
Table 3.7 shows the Gini coefficients and their alternatives, what income concepts and
recipient units they are based upon as well as the resulting changes in rankings. The
simultaneous replacement approach leads mainly to no or only small changes in ranking.
However, in some cases major changes take place. The alternative Gini coefficient used for
Jamaica in 1960 exceeds the one originally used by only 1.7 percentage points, which leads
to only little changes in ranking when focussing on the Gini based measures. However,
the income shares (which are not reported here) partly change dramatically, leaving the
poorest 20 per cent with only half the income and increasing the share of income going to
the richest 20 per cent of population considerably. The Atkinson measures answer these
dramatic changes with notably lower ranks.20
Turning to the year 1980, Canada and Norway experienced significant changes in
ranking. For both countries the alternative Gini coefficients were taken from LIS (2000)
18Interestingly, Canada, despite its smaller income, also regularly surpasses the US in the Human
Development Index calculated by the United Nations Development Programme UNDP (2002).
19In addition, this replacing approach is restricted to alternative data which are based on the same
year (plus/minus one year) as used in the main analysis. The source of alternative data is given in Table
3.7.
20One may doubt these rather extreme changes in the income shares. I nevertheless used the data as
both the ’original’ source (Deininger and Squire, 1996) and WIID classified them as reliable.
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and are based on the same specifications as the ones used in the original analysis. However,
the Gini coefficients itself differ considerably, thereby leading to changes up to 8 ranks.
Data on inequality provided by the Luxembourg Income Study are derived from micro
data sets and undergo different strategies of top and bottom coding - both may contribute
to the existing differences.
Mexico in 1990 is another example of the bandwidth of inequality data available for
one particular point in time. Both Gini coefficients were provided by Deininger and Squire
(1996) but belong to different quality classifications. The main difference between the two
indices is the income share going to the richest 20 per cent of population, which amounts
to 59.3 per cent in the first distribution but is declining to 53.6 per cent in the one
used alternatively. Consequently, distribution of income is more equal according to the
alternative data and especially the measures that penalise the existing degree of inequality
more rank Mexico up to 6 positions higher.
In a second kind of sensitivity analysis, I use a regression-based approach to deal with
the inconsistencies in terms of the income concepts and reference units used. The sample
is expanded by adding data of countries not considered in the main analysis but which
are part of the reliable set in WIID (2000). This enables us to get several observations
per country at the same time which should enhance our ability to identify the reference
unit and income definition effects. In particular, I regress the Gini coefficients available
on the income definition (expenditure, net income, unknown income, or gross income,
the excluded category), and the reference unit considered (household, family, unknown,
equivalized, or person, the excluded category). Following suggestions from Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001), dummy variables for Deininger-Squire data labelled as ’cs’ (no consis-
tent source) and ’ps’ (primary source unknown) are included.
Regression 1 in Table 3.8 shows that indeed the income definition and the choice of
reference unit do matter. Expenditure-based and net-income or equivalized Gini coeffi-
cients are typically lower, while household-based Gini coefficients appear to be higher.21
The interaction term net income and OECD countries in the second regression shows that
the difference between gross and net income is largely a phenomenon of OECD countries,
as one would expect (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
As a next step, the Gini coefficients are adjusted according to the regression results
from the first estimation. All the Gini coefficients are thereby based on the omitted cate-
gories, i.e. gross income per person. This way I hope to have dealt with the most glaring
21The somewhat surprising result about household-based Gini coefficients was also found by Lund-
berg and Squire (1999). Note that the regressions here have considerably higher explanatory power (as
measured by the R-squared) as the ones used by Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Lundberg and Squire
(1999).
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inconsistencies, although further adjustments are surely possible (Atkinson and Bran-
dolini, 2001).
How do the results change if one uses these adjusted Gini coefficients for the calculation
of the Gini based measures? Table 3.9 shows that generally the results do not change
greatly. Using the Sen measure, the vast majority of rankings remain the same or change
only by one position. Regarding the Dagum measure, more significant variations happen,
but again there is more persistence than change. The year 1990 marks some kind of outlier
with almost 40 per cent of the rank changes happened to be by two positions. Moreover,
most of the dramatic rank reversals and changes discussed earlier still hold.22
These sensitivity analyses suggest that few of the basic results on the large absolute
impact of income inequality and the change in ranks as a result of it are seriously affected
by using different data sets. However, quite a number of individual rankings are concerned
so that analyses focussing on smaller differences, particularly among OECD countries,
should be based upon more consistent data sources rather than rely on the somewhat
heterogeneous information used here (e.g. Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta, 2001).
3.2.3 Comparisons across Time
The previous discussion has already suggested that in some countries inequality has
changed considerably. At the same time, it appears that there is also a great deal of
stability in income inequality measures. Most countries either seem to improve or worsen
in rank at a point in time when inequality is considered, with this relationship not chang-
ing much over time. This question is examined a bit more closely now.
A first impression can be gleaned from Table 3.10 which shows average Gini coefficients
from the 1960s to the 1990s. What emerges is a great deal of stability. The average Gini
coefficient, whether raw or adjusted based on regression 1 in Table 3.8, does not appear
to have changed a lot (see also Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and Squire, 1999).23
This average could, however, mask some variation. To arrive at a better understanding,
a regression based approach is chosen. As a first step, it would be helpful to see whether,
controlling for country-specific fixed and random effects, there are temporal trends in
inequality. In Table 3.11 specifications (1) and (2) show the results from the fixed and
22For example, while Brazil and Indonesia still move towards similar welfare levels once inequality
is considered in the measurement, Brazil remains more ranks ahead in the inequality-adjusted welfare
measures. This is mostly due to the fact that the Indonesian data are based on expenditures while the
Brazil data are based on gross incomes. Similarly, Britain rises less in the early years considered and it
falls more in the later years once the adjusted Gini is used, since an equivalence scale was applied to
calculate the original data.
23The small observed changes could be due to compositional changes.
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random effects regressions.24 While the general impression of great stability is supported,
it is suggested that, when compared to the 1990s, inequality was significantly higher in
the 1960s, and significantly lower in the 1980s, but the average differences were not very
large in magnitude.25
The last two specifications in Table 3.11 are fixed effects regressions testing for an
intertemporal Kuznets curve, i.e. the hypothesis that as countries go through the process
of development, inequality first worsens and then improves again. The results are quite
clear here. There is not even the smallest hint for such an inverse U relationship that would
hold systematically across all countries (see also Deininger and Squire, 1998; Lundberg and
Squire, 1999). In fact, specification (4) rather suggests the opposite, namely a U shaped
relationship, even though it is not a very distinct curve. Thus, on average, systematic
trends in income distribution that relate either to temporal trends or to trends in income
could not be detected. It does not appear that inequality within countries is rising or
falling systematically. For the study of well-being, this is a significant finding since it
basically means that assessments of changes in well-being will not differ much for most
countries if one switches from an income growth rate to a measure that evaluates the
observed growth in the distribution-sensitive measures.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plot two typical examples. While Brazil and Indonesia differ greatly
with respect to the degree of existing inequality, the income distributions itself did, in a
relative sense, not vary a lot in the last decades. This results in comparatively small dif-
ferences between an income growth rate and the growth rate of the distribution-adjusted
income measures (illustrated by similar height of the first columns of each measure). At
the same time, this general stability masks some apparent rises and declines in inequality
in those countries. For example, in Brazil income distribution appears to have become no-
tably more unequal between 1961 and 1990. In the sub-period 1981-1989, this trend was
accompanied by only moderate income growth leading not only to smaller, but negative
growth rates in the inequality-adjusted welfare measures. In 1997, income inequality was
at an all-time low and positive growth rates are reported for all measures for the period
1990-1997. Thus, one should not interpret longer-term stability as the absence of any
developments in sub-periods (see also Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). Canada and Fin-
land are two other examples where changes in inequality differed in different time periods
(Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Finland is particularly notable for the fact that inequality appears
to have declined considerably since the 1980s leading to higher changes in well-being once
inequality is considered. Finally, the case of China (Figure 3.8) illustrates that consider-
able income growth is not automatically associated with a worsening income distribution,
24A Hausman test suggests that random effects would be preferable to use, although the results do not
differ much.
25These results are robust to using the adjusted Gini coefficients.
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although higher inequality in the 1990s let the inequality-adjusted growth rates become
smaller.
It thus appears that increasing income inequality observed in some rich countries
are not global processes.26 It seems not to be the case that all industrialised countries
are condemned by global forces or other factors to face ever-rising inequality. Although a
careful investigation of this issue goes beyond the scope of the present work, the differences
in experience suggest that the role of economic policy in generating and combating income
inequality is quite considerable (see also Atkinson, 1997; Aghion and Williamson, 1999).
Despite this general rule, there are some notable exceptions and it is important to
emphasise that in some countries the assessment of income growth seriously bias our view
of changes in well-being. In particular, Britain and the US will be studied now.27 The
impact of inequality on changes in well-being in the US was already examined in Klasen
(1994). Here, the analysis is extended to the year 2000 and some additional measures are
presented. Data on income and inequality are taken from the Historical Income Tables
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census, 2002).28 The reported Gini coefficients
are somewhat higher, but follow a similar trend as the ones used in the previous analysis.
Figure 3.9 shows the basic results. During the 1950s and the 1960s, high annual growth
was accompanied by falling inequality which ensures that increases in well-being were
considerably above the income growth rate. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
low to moderate income growth was accompanied by sharply rising inequality so that
well-being grew by negligible amounts. In fact, it shrank in the 1980s, depending on the
measure.29
Since economic growth has picked up since 1993 and unemployment is/was at a 30
years low, one may wonder how well-being changed in the so-called ’new economy.’ Figure
3.10 gives an impression. Since 1993, income growth has been still somewhat below the
high growth rates of the 1960s, and inequality continues to worsen (although at a much
slower pace) in the 1990s. This time, it is more due to greater income increases among
the rich, rather than deteriorations among the poor which was the case in the 1980s. This
rising inequality means that well-being in the ’New Economy’ was growing considerably
26Based on the LIS, Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) find that in the majority of OECD countries,
there was some increase in inequality in the 1980s. But timing and extent differed greatly and it was far
from being a universal phenomenon. See also Ayala, Martinez, and Ruiz-Huerta (2001).
27Many formerly socialist countries experienced even sharper increases in inequality during the period
of transition which was also accompanied by negative income growth. In Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine this
resulted in dramatic welfare losses up to 75 per cent for the period 1988-1995 according to Atkinson
(ε = 2) and Dagum measures. For a detailed discussion, see Grün and Klasen (2001).
28For a more detailed description of the data source see Klasen (1994).
29Also here, one can see the difference between the Gini-based measures and the Atkinson measures.
The poorest did particularly badly in the 1980s and the Atkinson measure with ε = 2 shows a deterioration
in well-being.
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more slowly than in the much-maligned 1960s where high growth was accompanied by
falling inequality.
The story for Britain looks much the same (Figure 3.11). The income data is again
taken from the World Bank (WDI, 2002) but now combined with inequality series pro-
duced by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) covering the time span 1961-1991.30 Looking
at the total period, changes in well-being become gradually smaller when more and more
importance is attached to the existing inequality. But again, the development within sub
periods was highly diverse. In the first two decades, moderate income growth was accom-
panied by falling inequality thus leading to sharper increases in well-being. In the 1980s,
moderate income growth translated into stagnation of well-being once the sharply rising
inequality is accounted for (see also Atkinson, 1997).
3.2.4 Global Well-Being and Inequality
As is well-known, global inequality is more a result of inequality between nations than
inequality within nations (e.g. Anand, 1993; Berry, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1991;
Milanovic, 2002). The richest 20 per cent of the world consume some 70-80 per cent of
world income (depending on the calculation and the countries included), leaving some 2-3
per cent to the poorest 20 per cent, which is far larger than the discrepancy between the
rich and poor in any one country (UNDP, 1999; Milanovic, 2002). As a result, one would
expect that consideration of this inequality between nations should have a considerable
impact on measures of well-being. Figure 3.12, based on a sample which captures some 81
per cent of the world population in 1998 but leaves out quite a few of the poorest countries
as well as many transition countries, shows that it does indeed. Using the Atkinson mea-
sures, world well-being is less than half if applying ε = 1 and only about a quarter if ε = 2
is assumed for all the years considered. This is to say that ’the world’ would be as well
off as it is currently if it only had half or a quarter its income but that distributed evenly.
Including the missing poor and transition countries, even more dramatic reductions in
well-being would occur. Global inequality is not just a political, economic, and social
problem, it is a welfare problem as it reduces aggregate global well-being considerably.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 furthermore suggest that global inequality in the underlying
sample does not seem to have increased a great deal over the last 30 years. While it was
relatively stable between 1970 and 1980, it somewhat decreased since then. The growth
of the Atkinson measures far surpasses the growth in mean global income, particularly
in the 1980s. This is mostly due to high and fairly evenly spread per capita growth in
30Gini coefficients and income shares by decile group (based on before housing costs) are kindly provided
by Jayne Taylor.
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China and India, as well as high growth in other dynamic Asian economies which push up
income growth of the poorest three quintiles of the world income distribution, as Figure
3.13 shows (see also Schultz, 1998).
Income growth and changing distribution could also result in a considerable degree of
income mobility. Table 3.12 illustrates how many country quintiles fall into the particular
global quintiles and what changes took place between 1970 and 1998. According to the
admittedly rather crude measure, there seems to be a great deal of stability, since 203 out
of the 360 country quintiles belong to the same world quintile in both years.31 Furthermore,
this stability is very much concentrated at the lower and upper tail of the world income
distribution (see also Quah, 1993). In case of the richest global quintile this finding can be
attributed to many OECD economies, which, except for their poorest country quintiles,
already succeeded in 1970 to belong entirely to this income group. Turning to the bottom
end, most African countries considered in this analysis could not drop out of the lowest
spots in the global income distribution.32 Among the population that managed to move
upwards and reach the highest income category in 1998 are the second to fourth quintiles
of Korea as well as the poorest three quintiles of Singapore. Similar upward mobility
can be observed for Indonesia, China, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Thailand, while many
African countries like Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya as well as Bangladesh,
Colombia, and Guatemala exhibit downward mobility. In 1998, their country quintiles are
found among poorer global quintiles than in 1970.
Looking at the results obtained from the expanded sample which considers 15 transi-
tion countries in addition, it becomes clear, that the assessment of global inequality and
well-being is to some extent driven by sample size, the period considered, and the choice
of income data. Figure 3.14 illustrates the well-being changes between 1988 and 1998 for
this second global analysis. The qualitative findings are largely the same, but from a quan-
titative perspective, results do differ from those shown in Figure 3.13. Income growth per
global quintile happened at a much smaller scale and the richest 20 per cent even realised
a loss in income. The overall mean income remains nearly unchanged. Global inequality
seems to have declined as the Atkinson measures indicate positive growth rates.
Exploring the reasons for the striking differences, it turns out that mainly two facts
contribute to them. Firstly, for the expanded sample PPP adjusted income data provided
by the World Bank (WDI, 2002) had to be used since in the PWT only few data on
transition economies are available. As became evident from the comparisons of welfare
measures, the World Bank’s calculation assumes that incomes in many of the poorer
countries are somewhat lower than in the Penn World Tables (see Tables 3.4 to 3.6).33
31In fact, income mobility is much higher, since there is a lot variability within each world quintile.
32The increasing number of country quintiles falling into the poorest world quintile is mainly due to
the fact that the second poorest quintile of China could climb into the next income category.
33Global inequality automatically appears to be greater when relying on these data.
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But not only levels, also growth rates differ considerably between the two data sources.
Calculating the average change in income of those countries included in both analyses
between 1988 and 1998, income growth amounted to 18.4 per cent according to the PWT,
but account for only 5.1 per cent when using the World Bank data. The differences in
quintile growth between the two analyses can certainly be attributed to these discrep-
ancies. Secondly, compositional changes of quintiles may especially add to the negative
income growth of the richest global quintile. In 1988, the majority of country quintiles
of the transition countries belonged to the fourth and fifth global quintiles. By 1998, the
transition economies considered here have experienced an average income loss of 37 per
cent and many country quintiles fell back to the third global quintile. The drop makes
room for other countries to fill the gap, but obviously these losses cannot be balanced out.
On the other hand, as the spread of incomes has become smaller, both Atkinson measures
reward these developments and point to considerably increases in global welfare.
Thus, in line with some other work (e.g. Schultz, 1998) but in contrast to findings
from studies by UNDP (1999) and Milanovic (2002), there has not been a uniform rise
in global inequality, nor has there been no mobility of countries up and down the world
income distribution.34 Including even more of the poorest countries would, however, some-
what temper this assessment as they are likely to have contributed to increasing global
inequality and less mobility.
Clearly, global inequality is associated with major reductions in well-being. In fact,
the reductions are larger than similar reductions within countries since inter-country in-
equality is so much larger than intra-country inequality. At the same time, high growth in
China and India, where most of the world’s poor live, and considerably mobility suggest
that we are not necessarily facing a world of rising and ever more rigid global distribution.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
From a theoretical point of view, the inclusion of income inequality in a measure of
well-being is well justified. Empirical studies confirm the hypothesis that individual and
thus aggregate welfare is negatively affected if incomes are more widely dispersed. In
the past, indicators which explicitly take the existing distribution of income into account
when measuring aggregate welfare have been proposed. Here, I tried to demonstrate that
34Milanovic (2002) uses micro data to generate estimates for global inequality in 1988 and 1993. He
finds sharply rising global inequality. The difference between his and my finding is probably due to the
choice of time period, the large representation of transition economies in his data set, and the use of mean
income figure that is based on micro data and may bear little resemblance with national accounts data
used here. For a discussion of national accounts versus survey data see also Ravallion (2002).
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the evaluation of welfare should rely on such indicators as well. The impression of well-
being derived from inequality-adjusted measures sometimes drastically differs from the
one obtained when looking at the mean income solely.
To summarise the multi-faceted results, considering income inequality clearly affects
the absolute level of welfare. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile, but also the US have
considerably lower levels of well-being than suggested by per capita income. Ranking
the welfare level of countries, these economies perform worse once inequality-adjusted
measures are applied. Whereas Indonesia, Bangladesh, Finland, and Belgium are examples
of reaching a higher well-being rank than their pure income rank.
As in most countries income distribution has remained fairly stable over the last 40
years, the consideration of income inequality has a comparatively minor impact on in-
tertemporal comparisons of well-being. But in some countries (notably the group of tran-
sition economies, but also Britain and the US) the impression of change in well-being
differs when level and changes of inequality are allowed for. Thus, it seems worth to
explore the linkages between growth, inequality, and well-being further.
Due to the extremely large global income inequality, global well-being is very much
lower than it would be if incomes were more equally distributed. On the other hand, for
both samples of countries considered (which unfortunately exclude many of the poorest
countries) changes in global well-being are larger than suggested by the income growth
measure since especially in the 1980s inequality seems to have declined. But the global
analysis also illustrated that sample composition and source of data are critical compo-
nents in any empirical analysis. Finally, comparing the formation of global income quintiles
in 1970 and 1998, it became obvious that countries moved upwards and downwards the
world income distribution, suggesting that there is scope for economic policy to influence
within-country inequality which then also affects global inequality.
Being aware that much of the data applied here were not intended to be used in
such examinations, I tried to verify the results. Although data on inequality are still not
sufficiently consistent neither across time nor across countries, many of the main findings
turned out to be relatively robust. The late 1990s have seen the evolution of the World
Income Inequality Database which provides easy access to indexes and distributions as
well as quality ratings thereby enabling us to make a careful choice. Despite these already
immense improvements, future developments should be directed at generating consistent
and internationally comparable time series on inequality.
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Table 3.7: continued
Changes in Rankinga
Year Country Gini Based Alternative Based Atkinson Sen Atkinson Dagum
used on Gini on (ε = 1) (ε = 2)
Uganda 33.0 E N Heq 44.4 E - Hd - -2 -3 -2
Zambia 48.3 E - Hd 43.5 E N P +3 +1 +4 +1
1998 Denmark 37.4 I G Fc 33.7 I N Fc - - +1 -
Madagascar 43.4 E N P 46.0 E - Hpcd - -1 -1 -1
Turkey 41.5 E - Hpcd 49.0 I N Hc -1 -2 -1 -4
Uganda 39.2 E - Hpc 40.8 E - P - - - -
a: A positive sign corresponds to a higher rank, a negative one indicates a worsening in ranking.
Inequality data applied is predominantly provided by Deininger and Squire (1996). Additional data sources
are indicated as follows.
b: Data originally provided by Luxembourg Income Study.
c: See WIID (2000) for further information on data source.
d: Data taken from the World Bank (World Bank, 2002).
Income concept is either income (I) or expenditure (E), and both concepts can be gross (G) or net (N).
Unit of reference can be per person (P), household (H), or household per capita (Hpc). In a few cases an
equivalence scale was applied to calculate the data (Heq). If any component is not reported or unknown,
- is shown.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Gini Coefficients
(1) (2)
Expenditure -3.89∗∗ (0.38) -3.59∗∗ (0.38)
Net income -1.94∗∗ (0.27) 1.38∗∗ (0.47)
Unknown income 1.66 (1.43) 1.81 (1.40)
Household 0.99∗∗ (0.28) 1.09∗∗ (0.27)
Family 0.73 (0.45) 0.85 (0.44)
Unknown reference unit -1.51 (1.55) -1.45 (1.52)
Equivalized -4.72∗∗ (0.30) -4.46∗∗ (0.29)
Primary source unknown 1.81∗∗ (0.63) 1.93∗∗ (0.61)
No consistent source -0.31 (0.25) -0.34 (0.24)
OECD * Net income - -4.74∗∗ (0.55)
Intercept 36.03∗∗ (0.26) 35.84∗∗ (0.26)
N 2070 2070
R2 0.21 0.24
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.9: Change in Rankings Due to Adjusted Gini Coefficients
No change 1 Rank 2 Ranks 3 Ranks 4+ Ranks
Sen measure
1960 35 7 0 0 1
1970 28 18 2 0 0
1980 26 22 6 2 1
1990 42 22 3 3 0
1998 43 21 6 1 1
Dagum measure
1960 24 12 7 0 0
1970 29 14 1 4 0
1980 26 21 7 3 0
1990 31 21 15 3 0
1998 35 30 6 0 1
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Table 3.10: Average Gini Coefficients over Time
Average Number of
Year Average Gini adjusted Gini observations
1960s 37.9 38.6 197
1970s 34.8 36.2 427
1980s 32.7 34.7 780
1990s 34.3 36.6 666
Adjusted Gini coefficients are based on regression (1) reported in Table 3.8.
Table 3.11: Temporal Trends in Inequality and Kuznets Curve
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 34.55∗∗ (0.19) 39.77∗∗ (0.89) 37.22∗∗ (0.82) 40.63∗∗ (1.06)
Dummy 1960s 1.31∗∗ (0.40) 1.36∗∗ (0.40) - -
Dummy 1970s -0.45 (0.32) -0.44 (0.32) - -
Dummy 1980s -1.23∗∗ (0.26) -1.24∗∗ (0.26) - -
Income per capita - - -0.20∗∗ (0.06) -0.75∗∗ (0.16)
Income per capita, inverse - - 1.03 (1.61) -
Income per capita, squared - - - 0.02∗∗ (0.00)
N 2070 2070 1570 1570
R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Specification (1) estimates fixed effects, specification (2) random effects. Reference category is the
period 1990-1998. Specifications (3) and (4) test for the Kuznets hypothesis using a fixed effects
estimation.
Table 3.12: Income Mobility, 1970-1998
1998
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 35 7 0 0 0
2nd 25 10 4 2 0
1970 3rd 16 13 13 6 0
4th 4 14 28 47 28
5th 0 0 0 10 98
Rows and columns show the number of country
quintiles falling into the first to fifth world
quintile in 1970 and 1998, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Welfare Comparison: Brazil versus Indonesia, 1980-1998
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Notes: GNP/cap: GNP per capita, constant 1996 US-Dollars (WDI, 1999, 2001). GNI/cap: Real GNI per
capita, 1996 prices (WDI, 2002). RGNPCH: Real GNP per capita, 1996 prices (Summers and Heston,
1991; Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2001).
Figure 3.2: Welfare Comparison: Canada versus USA, 1970-1990
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Notes: For definition of incomes, see Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Welfare Comparison: Sri Lanka versus Peru, 1980-1998
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Figure 3.4: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in Brazil
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Notes: The income concept used here is GDP per capita at market prices in constant local currency
(WDI, 2002).
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Figure 3.5: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in Indonesia
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Notes: See notes in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.6: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in Canada
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Figure 3.7: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in Finland
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Figure 3.8: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in China
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Figure 3.9: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in the US
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Notes: Calculations are based on U.S. census data (constant 1982 dollars). Mean refers to the mean
money income of families.
Figure 3.10: ’Great Society versus New Economy’
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Figure 3.11: Average Annual Growth of Well-Being in Great Britain
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Figure 3.12: World Well-Being, 1970-1998
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Figure 3.13: Growth in World Well-Being, 1970-1998
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Figure 3.14: Growth in World Well-Being (Including Transition Economies),
1988-1998
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Part II
Wage Differentials in South Africa
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Chapter 4
Introductory Remarks
4.1 The South African Labour Market
Since a long time, the South African labour market is characterised by peculiarities in
many respects. With the official end of the Apartheid in 1994, the new openness also
reached labour market issues and a number of profound analyses have been conducted to
arrive at a comprehensive picture of the current constitution of the labour market and to
derive policy conclusions (e.g. Kingdon and Knight, 2001c,a,d; Klasen and Woolard, 1999;
Standing, Sender, and Weeks, 1996). This section presents various aspects of the South
African labour market as they provide essential background information for the remaining
analysis concerned with wages and wage differentials in the South African labour market.
With an official unemployment rate of 29.4 per cent in 2002, South Africa ranges
together with Algeria and Armenia in the group of countries having the highest unem-
ployment rates in the world when the standard definition of the International Labour
Organisation is applied (Stats SA, 2002; ILO, 2002). However, as Kingdon and Knight
(2001c) show, the expanded definition of unemployment which relaxes the criterion of
seeking work constitute a more appropriate measure of unemployment in South Africa
as non-searching persons are frequently discouraged workers. According to this indicator,
the unemployment rate amounts to 40.9 per cent in 2002 (Stats SA, 2002).1
Though these numbers have already reached an alarming magnitude, they still do not
tell the total truth. Looking at race specific rates reveals that Africans are much more
often affected by unemployment than Whites.2 Using the broad definition, 47.8 of African
1Following the suggestion of Kingdon and Knight (2001c), I will apply the broad definition of labour
force participation (and thus unemployment) which includes people who although not actively looking
for a job would nevertheless like to work.
2The following empirical analysis will only consider these two population groups, whereas Africans
refer to people regarded as indigenous to Africa and represent 75 per cent of the South African population.
Coloured people and Indian descendants are excluded. In total, they account for ca. 11 per cent of the
total population. In 2002, official (expanded) unemployment rates amounted to 24.6 (32.4) per cent for
Coloureds and 18.7 (24.8) for Indian people (Stats SA, 2002).
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labour force participants were unemployed in 2002 whereas the share for Whites lies only
by 9.9 per cent (Stats SA, 2002). Within each population groups, unemployment rates
also differ across gender, regions, and occupations, with the largest differences occurring
among Africans.
People can work either in the formal or informal sector of the economy as employees
or being self-employed. Formal wage-employment is normally characterised by regular
payments on the basis of a written contract. This is contrary to informal jobs which
often come along with casual employment and typically avoid registration as well as tax
and social security payments. Such jobs cover a broad set of activities, frequently on a
self-employed basis, and are associated with different economic fortune (Devey, Skinner,
and Valodia, 2002). In many developing countries, the informal sector acts as a base to
search for wage employment and absorbs many unemployed people.3 In South Africa,
only a comparatively small share of 15 to 20 per cent of workers has been engaged in
the informal economy in the late 1990s despite high unemployment (Devey, Skinner, and
Valodia, 2002). Kingdon and Knight (2001b) explicitly address the question why the
unemployed do not enter the informal sector. They decline the hypothesis that people
are voluntarily unemployed but argue that there might well exist barriers to enter this
sector. Skills, experience, and contacts are required to successfully establish oneself in the
informal economy.
The prospects of finding employment are even more dismally as also the formal sec-
tor exhibits a certain degree of rigidity. Although not being solely responsible, the slow
growth of the South African economy since the mid-1980’s contributed to a static or even
decreasing number of formal sector jobs (Hofmeyr, 2002; Chandra and Nganou, 2001).
In the presence of high and rising unemployment, one would expect to see a decline in
real wages. However, over the last decades formal sector wages were found to be rather
insensitive to the level of unemployment (Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002; Fallon and Lucas,
1998). Labour market legislation (e.g. minimum wages in much of the formal sector) and
powerful trade unions seem to play a major role thereby (Kingdon and Knight, 2001b).
Hofmeyr (2002) suggests, that this development has affected new labour market entrants
in a particularly negative way and created classes of relatively privileged (unionised) for-
mal sector workers and increasingly marginalised outsiders who are looking for such jobs.4
The following empirical analysis of wages and wage differentials will only focus on
full-time formal sector employees for basically two reasons. Firstly, as informal sector ac-
tivities prove to be rather heterogeneous in terms of regularity, continuity, and payments,
3For example in the 1990s, urban informal employment in all Africa is estimated to absorb 61 per cent
of the urban labour force. Similarly in Asia, where before 1997, between 40 and 50 per cent of the urban
labour force was involved in informal sector activities (ILO, 2001).
4For further discussion of union wage premia for African and White workers see for example Butcher
and Rouse (2001) and Rospabe (2001b).
66
disregarding them in an analysis assures at least to some extent that only wages earned
in a comparable employment status are considered, because all formal sector jobs (have
to) meet certain legal standards. Secondly, as income from regular wage-employment on
average greatly exceeds the income earned in the informal sector, the former is surely
a preferred state (Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt, 2002; Kingdon and Knight, 2001b).
Working in the informal sector often means to be involved in survivalist activities and
provides only a second-best form of employment (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1998).
4.2 Assessing the Main Data Source
The data for the empirical analysis in Part II and Part III are taken from the October
Household Surveys (OHS). Starting in 1994, the surveys were carried out annually until
1999.5 The surveys are independent cross sections, i.e. for each of them different samples
were drawn. A large but varying number of households across all provinces of South Africa
was sampled allowing a detailed snapshot of labour market conditions and outcomes as
well as other (development) indicators like health status, access to and use of health ser-
vices, household structure, or type of dwelling. For the years used in this work, 1995, 1997,
and 1999, similar sample designs have been applied. 3000 enumeration areas were sampled
and 10 households within each of them have been interviewed, resulting in a sample size
of 30000 households. The OHS 1999 differs somewhat as households were selected from a
master sample allowing that respondents could be visited again, for example to take part
in the twice-yearly Labour Force Survey (LFS) which succeeded the OHS series in 2000
(SADA, 2001).6
The basic design of the questionnaire remained relatively unchanged across all survey
years. However, some amendments in the way questions could be answered were made.
For example, regarding the level of education respondents were given a more detailed list
of school grades and degrees in the later years. To arrive at comparable numbers of years
of schooling, it was necessary to aggregate the detailed information in 1997 and 1999 to
the relatively crude classification in 1995.
There was also a major change in the way incomes could be reported. While in 1995,
actual amounts of income were asked, in the later years it was possible to indicate an
appropriate income class only. Over the years, an increasing number of workers preferred
5In 1993, the South African Labour Development Research Unit (SALDRU) already conducted a
household survey in South Africa, in conjunction with the World Bank. With a sample size of 9000
households in 360 clusters it was however a relatively small survey.
6The LFS is based on a rotating household panel structure which contrasts with the static nature of
the OHS data. It is specifically designed to measure labour market dynamics like changes in employment
and unemployment (Stats SA, 2001a).
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to report their earnings just by specifying the income category they fall into. From an
econometric point of view, working with grouped data has serious consequences as the
variance of the data is artificially reduced (see also chapter 7.2). In the surveys used here,
respondents could choose among 14 income categories. i.e. a relatively detailed description
of the income distribution is possible. Finally, as for a proportion of workers both point
and interval data on income are available, the former can be used to approximate actual
values for those workers only reporting categories.7
To summarise, the series of OHS provides detailed information on working and living
conditions in South Africa since the end of Apartheid. The rich data have already been
used in a number of studies on labour market issues.8 The empirical analysis of wages
and wage differentials by race and gender that will follow is based on three years of
the October Household Survey. In Part II, the surveys are treated as independent cross
sections providing information on labour market outcomes at a particular point in time.
As several years are studied it is possible to assess changes affecting different groups of
workers, like the change in average wages of particular population groups. The analysis
in Part III tries to overcome the static nature of cross sectional data. With the help of
cohort techniques it is possible to link the survey years in a way that enables us to follow
particular age groups over time and to study their particular development.
7The discussion in chapter 6.2 will go into detail how the variables used for estimations have been
derived.
8For example, the extent of racial and gender discrimination was examined by Allanson, Atkins, and
Hinks (2000b), Allanson and Atkins (2001), Erichsen and Wakeford (2001), and Rospabe (2001a). The
nature of unemployment was subject to studies by Kingdon and Knight (2001a,d,c), and Klasen and
Woolard (1999).
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Chapter 5
Reviewing the Literature
5.1 Theoretical Models of Discrimination
Different labour market outcomes emerging between people may in principle be ascribed
to two effects: Either the persons have different preferences, i.e. supply-side factors play
an important role, or they meet different demands. In the classic economic context, the
former reflects voluntary choices as people behave rationally to maximise their welfare and
no further investigation is needed. As however became evident from sociological and also
economic research, social influences and traditions do shape the consciousness of people
thereby influencing individual choices as well. In contrast to demand-side factors which
especially correspond to labour market discrimination and whereon the present work will
focus, such outcomes have been termed pre-labour market or societal discrimination (Blau,
Ferber, and Winkler, 1998).1
The following analysis aims at determining the extent of wage discrimination by race
and gender in the South African labour market. Before shortly browsing the main theo-
retical models it is advisable to start with a definition of labour market discrimination.2
”We define labor market discrimination as a situation in which persons who provide
labor market services and who are equally productive [...] are treated unequally in a
way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race [...] or gender. By
’unequal’ we mean these persons receive different wages or face different demands
for their services at a given wage” (Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3168).
1For further discussion on socialisation and its consequences for individual choices see for example
Altonji and Blank (1999), Anker (1997), Becker (1991) and Epstein (1988).
2As my emphasis will be on the empirical analysis, I only review the models in brief and refer to
original sources and standard text books on labour economics (e.g. Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998;
Ehrenberg and Smith, 2000). In addition, a comprehensive overview of both theoretical literature and
empirical analysis is given by Cain (1986) and Altonji and Blank (1999).
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It is important to note that in accordance with this definition the extent of e.g. wage
discrimination equals the ’unexplained gap’, i.e. the discrepancy in wages after personal
productivity-related characteristics are controlled for. The fact that differences in observ-
able characteristics (e.g. amount of human capital acquired) could date from pre-labour
market discrimination is not taken into account. Similarly, anticipation of discrimination
may lead to a change in preferences (e.g. to invest less in human capital) and such feedback
effects of labour market discrimination are also not considered. Especially the empirical
work on labour market discrimination is almost exclusively concentrated on the deter-
mination of the unexplained gap (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998; Altonji and Blank,
1999).3
Becker (1957) started the economic analysis of labour market discrimination. He de-
veloped the idea that employers, employees, and customers may have prejudices against
members of particular (minority) groups and introduced the term of tastes for discrim-
ination. Given, these discriminatory tastes influence the behaviour of people, they do
have an impact on earnings and employment chances of the discriminated group. The
discrimination coefficient captures the costs associated with discriminatory tastes. It ei-
ther corresponds to a kind of discount the discriminated group has to accept (employer
and consumer discrimination) or reflects a premium that employees command for working
with members of the discriminated group.4 Regarding the persistence of discrimination,
the taste based theories suggest various outcomes. If in a competitive labour market both
discriminatory and less or non-discriminatory employers coexist, one would expect dis-
crimination to be eliminated in the long run as discriminatory firms produce at higher
costs and will therefore be displaced. This is contrary to employee and consumer dis-
crimination which may, as employers’ profit maximisation is not distorted, explain why
discrimination continues to exist also in the long run (Becker, 1992; Ehrenberg and Smith,
2000).5
Continuing discrimination can also be due to certain beliefs employers have regarding
the productivity or commitment of particular groups. The theory of statistical discrimi-
nation argues that hiring or promoting decisions may not only be based on information
on skills and qualification. Employers, who are not assumed to have a taste for discrimi-
nation, may also make use of easily observable characteristics like race or gender or rely
3In the 1990s, audit studies have been used to alternatively examine labour market discrimination.
Resumes of job candidates who have the same paper qualifications relevant for productivity but differ
in gender or ethnicity are sent out to companies. Then, the probabilities of getting an interview are
compared (Altonji and Blank, 1999). For a critical assessment of the audit methods see for example
Heckman (1998).
4Employer discrimination may also take on the form of overpaying preferred workers. This behaviour
is known as employer nepotism.
5If (non-discriminatory) employers could recruit a segregated work force, there is no need to pay a
premium. As a result, wage discrimination would not occur but complete segregation (Blau, Ferber, and
Winkler, 1998).
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on previous experience to judge individual workers (Arrow, 1972; Phelps, 1972). Such be-
haviour is clearly discriminatory but has even more serious consequences if discriminated
people react in the expected way, i.e. do quit jobs more often and become less productive
as e.g. participation in firm-specific training was not granted. Discrimination persists since
employers are confirmed in their expectations and see no need to change (Blau, Ferber,
and Winkler, 1998; Becker, 1992).
Although rather an empirical observation than a theory, occupational segregation,
describing the fact that people belonging to different groups tend to work in different oc-
cupations, should also be considered explicitly. Similar to the discussion at the beginning
of this chapter, both supply-side and demand-side factors can explain the outcome and
only the latter can be attributed to (current) labour market discrimination (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 2000). Again, cultural values, social norms and the expectancy of labour mar-
ket discrimination may influence the occupational choice (Anker, 1997). As mentioned
before, occupational segregation may be the result of employee discrimination if employ-
ers hire segregated work forces to avoid the wage premium. If this strategy is successful,
no discriminatory wage gaps will emerge. The overcrowding model by Bergmann (1974)
brings the discussion a step forward by linking occupational segregation and earnings dif-
ferentials. If members of the discriminated group are crowded in particular occupations,
either because of discrimination or voluntarily, in comparison to the demand for such jobs
the supply of labour may be relatively large. Wage rates in crowded sectors will be com-
pressed and an unexplained wage gap between workers employed in different occupations
appears.
Having briefly reviewed the main theories, the question then arises how they relate
to discrimination in South Africa. As for more than 40 years the labour market was
heavily regulated in favour of Whites, one would expect to detect especially racial differ-
ences in labour market outcomes which cannot fully be explained by different personal
productivity-related characteristics. But the total extent of discrimination will be con-
siderably larger since pre-labour market discrimination and feedback effects also play a
major role. During Apartheid, access to education was restricted for Non-Whites and the
resulting level of human capital and thus productivity does not reflect voluntarily choices.
Furthermore, a system of job reservations was implemented by the Job Reservation Act
in the 1950s, thereby legally excluding Non-Whites from many jobs and training pro-
grams. Occupational segregation and even exclusion occurred as a result of such legal
constraints. Since the 1980s, the South African government has been undertaking liber-
alising steps due to increasing internal as well as external pressure. Already at the end of
that decade, most of the overt discriminatory acts have been abolished and a non-racial
and liberal legislation came into force. Labour market discrimination, however, could not
be eliminated so far but rather seems to take on different forms. According to Azam and
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Rospabe (1999), today’s wage discrimination in South Africa may be best explained by
statistical theories. In the empirical analysis to follow, I will investigate to what extent
the appearance of wage discrimination changed since the official end of Apartheid.
5.2 Labour Market Discrimination in South Africa
More than 40 years of racial legislation in South Africa resulted in a socially as well as
economically heavily segmented society. According to the Gini coefficient which in 1994
amounted to almost 60 per cent, South Africa belongs to the most unequal societies in the
world. The official end of Apartheid in 1994 provides a natural benchmark to assess any
progress regarding a more equal treatment of people belonging to different population
groups. As the previous discussion illustrated, discrimination happens at various fields
and to measure its full extent may turn out to be rather difficult. Although an empirical
investigation of the magnitude of the ’unexplained gap’ cannot take into account all
relevant aspects, it gives valuable information to what extent claims and commitments to
reduce racial as well as gender discrimination have already been translated into action.
One of the first studies determining the extent of racial wage discrimination in post-
Apartheid labour market was conducted by Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks (2000b).6 Analy-
sing mean hourly wages of male workers of all races in 1994, they at first document the
existing racial wage hierarchy. African and Coloured workers are found at the lower end of
the distribution of wages, with earnings of about one third of the mean wage for Whites.
Asian and White males have considerably higher earnings, but the mean wage of Asian
workers was still one third below that of White men. About one third of the wage differ-
ential between African and White workers could not be explained by different personal
characteristics. Regarding the wage differential between White workers and Coloured and
Asian workers, respectively, virtually all of the observed difference is explained by observ-
able characteristics. In a follow-up study the authors focus on the years 1995 and 1997
to see whether the end of Apartheid had immediate economic consequences regarding
labour market outcomes (Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000a). The results were rather
disillusioning as racial gross wage differentials were still substantial. Africans were found
in an even worse situation as they are the only group of workers that on average could
not realise an increase in wages.7 Regarding the extent of wage discrimination, there is
6Income inequality and the extent of wage discrimination during Apartheid have been analysed by
Knight and McGrath (1987), Treiman, McKeever, and Fodor (1996), Moll (1998), and Allanson, Atkins,
and Hinks (2000a). They all point to a slight declining tendency of both racial wage hierarchy and labour
market discrimination between 1980 and the early 1990s.
7This result is somewhat controversial, in particular as the authors study nominal wages. The present
work also comes to a different conclusion regarding the development of African wages. However, the
findings are not directly comparable since the samples of workers differ to some degree.
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limited evidence that it was somewhat reduced.
Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) examine wage differentials shortly before and after
the formal end of Apartheid. They determine the extent of racial wage discrimination
in 1993 and 1995 and expand the scope of analysis by considering wage gaps among
women as well. In both years, racial wage gaps among females are smaller than those
for males, but mean wages follow the same hierarchy. Earnings of Africans and Coloured
workers are considerably lower than earnings of Asian and White workers. Furthermore,
they find similar patterns of discrimination for male and female workers. Differences in
personal traits explain most of the observed wage differentials emerging between Whites
and Coloureds and Asians, respectively, and still a considerable portion of the gap between
Whites and Africans.
Rospabe (2002) undertakes one of the most comprehensive studies on labour market
outcomes in South Africa. For the years 1993 and 1999, she analyses the extent of racial
employment, occupational, and earnings discrimination among African and White men.
She concludes that five years after the end of Apartheid racial gaps in all three dimensions
are still substantial, but were declining during the period considered. In 1999, the extent
of discrimination still accounts for between 30 and 40 per cent depending on the kind
of labour market outcome. A second paper of her is devoted to gender discrimination in
several labour market outcomes in 1999 (Rospabe, 2001a). Substantial gender inequalities
were found which could only partly be explained by gender differences in productivity-
related characteristics. Especially occupational attainment is characterised by an utmost
unequal distribution which has to be predominantly attributed to discrimination.
So far, studies on discrimination in the South African labour market were either fo-
cused solely on earnings or examined several labour market outcomes separately. The
extent of discrimination is always derived by decomposing group differences into an ex-
plainable term and an unexplained term (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973; Gomulka and Stern,
1990).8 The following analysis proceeds differently. When estimating the wage differential
I will take into account that labour force participants may have different probabilities of
finding employment. Applying decomposition techniques suggested by Mavromaras (2003)
and Neuman and Oaxaca (1998), it is furthermore possible to use the information on the
different probabilities to detect effects that already arise at the selection into employment
stage and influence the wage rate in an indirect way. Regarding the time scope, three
years after the end of Apartheid will enter the analysis which will focus on both racial
and gender discrimination.
8The next chapter provides a detailed description of the standard method used in many decomposition
analyses. Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks (2000b) enhanced the standard technique allowing not only binary
but several (multilateral) comparisons of groups’ wage levels against a non-discriminatory norm.
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Chapter 6
The Empirical Approach
6.1 Determining the Extent of Direct and Indirect
Discrimination
Over the last 30 years, the approach to explain wage differentials, introduced into the
literature of economics1 by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), has not only been inten-
sively used but was also further developed and prompted to the evolution of alternative
techniques, respectively.2 Despite this, it became standard in decomposition analysis and
will be the starting point here.
Consider a standard wage equation:
Yi = X
′
iβ + ui, (6.1)
where Yi is the log of gross hourly wage of individual i, X
′
i is a vector of variables which
determine the market wage, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ui presents
the identically independently distributed error term. Given, within a population there
are different groups (by gender, race, religion etc.) one can calculate the average wage
differential between two groups by estimating separate wage equations and taking the
difference:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = X̄ ′1β̂1 − X̄ ′2β̂2. (6.2)
Expanding this expression by the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure β∗, which
is used to reward productivity-determining characteristics of both groups, leads to:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = X̄ ′1β̂1 − X̄ ′2β̂2 + X̄ ′1β∗ − X̄ ′1β∗ + X̄ ′2β∗ − X̄ ′2β∗. (6.3)
1Decomposition methods have been popular also in other branches of study for a long time. Examples
in the field of sociology are given by Althauser and Wigler (1972) and Duncan (1968).
2Some of the studies suggesting slight modifications of the original model will be referred to later.
Contributions to extend the model were also made by e.g. Nielsen (2000) and Leslie, Clark, and Drinkwater
(1997). A completely different approach to decompose wage differentials is suggested by Gupta, Oaxaca,
and Smith (2001) and Jenkins (1994). See also chapter 7.1.
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Valuing group differences of personal characteristics according to β∗ yields an estimate of
what the wage gap should be in the absence of labour market discrimination. Finally, the
right-hand side of equation (6.3) can be reformulated to display the well-known decom-
position components:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′ + X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗) + X̄ ′2(β∗ − β̂2). (6.4)
The first term presents that part of the wage differential which is due to different group
means of the productivity determining characteristics considered in X ′i and is therefore
called endowment or productivity component. Presuming Ȳ1 > Ȳ2, the second term mea-
sures overpayment of group 1, the third term underpayment of group 2, always in re-
lation to the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure β∗. The sum of the last two
terms equals that portion of the observed wage gap that cannot be explained by different
personal traits, i.e. the unexplained gap. This residual is then usually interpreted as dis-
crimination or market component.3 This interpretation assumes that all variables which
determine productivity differences are observable and accounted for in the wage equation
as well as that the functional form of the wage regression is correctly specified. Other-
wise, the extent of discrimination might be over- or underestimated due to unobservable
variables, measurement errors, or incorrect specification of the model.
There are several possibilities what the non-discriminatory wage structure could be. In
the early studies of wage decomposition one of the estimated mean wage structures was
often assumed to reflect an environment without discrimination, for example β∗ = β1.
Applying this strategy cancels out the second term of equation (6.4). In this context,
labour market discrimination corresponds to underpayment of the disadvantaged group
only. This approach was first suggested in the fundamental papers by Blinder (1973) and
Oaxaca (1973) and was then used in numerous decomposition analyses that followed. Cot-
ton (1988) formalised the idea that discrimination not only means a financial disadvantage
for people against who discrimination takes place, but can also show up in a monetary
benefit for the favoured group. According to this, the wage paid in the absence of dis-
crimination lies between the observed groups’ mean wages.4 This non-discriminatory wage
structure cannot be observed, but has to be derived. Cotton (1988) suggests an average
of the observed wage structures, weighted by the groups’ labour force shares.5 This idea
was further developed by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) who proposed a weighting scheme
3In the following this decomposition method which results in these two major components will be
called standard approach.
4In fact, even earlier studies already realised that employers’ preference for one group and their distaste
for another will distort both groups’ wages and that the non-discriminatory wage structure would therefore
lie ”somewhere between them” (Reimers, 1983, p. 573), but failed to provide some kind of theoretical
framework.
5Reimers (1983) weighted both estimated wage structures by 0.5.
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obtained from the estimation of a combined or pooled sample instead of constructing it
from a linear combination of separately estimated groups’ wage structures. Since this ap-
proach yields the smallest estimated standard errors for estimated differentials it became
standard in the field of decomposition analysis.
Incorporating consolidated findings from the literature on labour supply is also com-
mon in decomposition analysis. It is thoroughly documented that if the workers’ sub-
sample is no random sample of the population in terms of both observable and unobserv-
able factors, one faces the problem of sample selection. This arises ”when some of the
determinants of the work decision are also influencing the wage” (Vella, 1998, p. 129). As
long as one is interested in making inferences on workers solely, systematic censoring is not
a problem. However, conclusions drawn from a non-random sub-sample are not applicable
to a larger sample of the same population. If only observable factors cause the differences
between the two samples, they could easily be accounted for by using appropriate con-
trol variables in the wage equation. If the relationship between employment and wage is
characterised by a correlation between unobservable factors affecting work decision and
unobservables determining the wage, matters become complicated. Not including an esti-
mate of the unobservable characteristics influencing the employment process in the wage
equation will lead to biased coefficients (Vella, 1998).
Heckman (1976, 1979) proposed an estimator which basically treats the selection prob-
lem as an omitted variable problem. Sample selection is expected to lead to a correlation
of the error terms of employment and wage equation. By estimating a probit model on
employment propensity it is possible to determine the conditional expectation of the error
term, which is called the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). The IMR is then added to the set
of explanatory variables used in the wage equation.6 To see, in what respect this addi-
tional regressor influences the wage differential, it is helpful to start with the employment
equation.
Y ∗i = Z
′
iγ + εi (6.5)
Y ∗i represents the employment probability, a latent variable that can only be observed if
individual i is employed. Z ′i is a vector of variables determining employment, γ a vector of
parameters and εi is the i.i.d. error term with a normalised variance of 1. The probability
of being employed can be expressed by:
Prob(Y ∗i > 0) = Prob(εi > −Z ′iγ) = Φ(Z ′iγ), (6.6)
where Φ(Z ′iγ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The expected wage
6This so-called Heckman correction has been criticised mainly for its restrictive assumptions by Puhani
(2000), but is still widely used since it provides a convenient and easily implemented method to correct
for sample bias.
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conditioned on being employed equals:
E(Yi|Y ∗i > 0) = X ′iβ + E(ui|εi > −Z ′iγ) + vi = X ′iβ + θλi + vi, (6.7)
whereby θ = ρσu. It is an estimate of the product of the correlation between the error
terms of employment equation and the wage equation ρ and the standard deviation of the
wage error term σu. The inverse Mills ratio is represented by λi = φ(Z
′
iγ)/Φ(Z
′
iγ), with
φ(Z ′iγ) being the standard normal density function. After having incorporated the IMR
into both groups’ wage equations the wage differential equals:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = X̄ ′1β̂1 − X̄ ′2β̂2 + θ̂1λ̂1 − θ̂2λ̂2. (6.8)
Compared with equation (6.2), the wage differential is now enhanced by the difference
in the average selectivity bias between the two groups. This difference is called selection
term. Applying the pooled sample approach as the non-discriminatory norm to the first
two terms of equation (6.8) yields:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′ + X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗) + X̄ ′2(β∗ − β̂2) + (θ̂1λ̂1 − θ̂2λ̂2).7 (6.9)
Various studies performing decomposition analysis estimated selectivity corrected wage
equations. However, when starting the decomposition of the wage differential, the last
term of equation (6.9) was mostly neglected. Ashraf and Ashraf (1993), for example, esti-
mate selectivity corrected wage regressions to decompose the gender wage gap in Pakistan,
but did not consider this term at all. Similarly, a World Bank study analyses womens’
employment and pay in Latin America (Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 1992). Ordi-
nary least squares as well as selectivity corrected wage regressions have been estimated,
but only productivity-related and unexplained components of both estimation procedures
were interpreted. Duncan and Leigh (1980) and Reimers (1983) proceed differently. They
also estimate corrected wage regressions but put the selection term on the left hand side.
Thereby, they netted out the selection term from the overall wage differential, resulting
in ”a decomposition of the selectivity corrected wage differential” rather than a decom-
position of the observed wage differential (Neuman and Oaxaca, 1998, p. 5).
To the best of my knowledge, only the studies by Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) and
Mavromaras (2003) developed techniques how to decompose the selection term as well.
This additional decomposition will result in a second set of endowment and discrimination
effects associated with the selection into employment. The difference between the two
approaches lies in the supposed non-discriminatory norm. Whereas Neuman and Oaxaca
7The decomposition procedure, which results in these three major components, will be called selectivity
corrected approach.
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(1998) derive their results by assuming that one of the estimated wage structures is
representing a scenario without discrimination, Mavromaras (2003) applies the pooled
sample approach. Following the latter, one can expand and rearrange the selection term
analogously to the standard decomposition procedure:
θ̂1λ̂1 − θ̂2λ̂2 = θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂2) + λ̂1(θ̂1 − θ∗) + λ̂2(θ∗ − θ̂2).8 (6.10)
The first term of the right-hand side compares the mean IMR of the two groups and
represents the portion explained by different group means. The last two terms describe to
which extent individuals with equal λs are treated differently according to their groups’
affiliation. Again, if the non-discriminatory structure is assumed to be represented by one
of the estimated group’s structure, either of the last two terms would drop out.
Regarding the first term of equation (6.10) (i.e. the endowment component of the
selection term), a further decomposition is suggested.9 According to Mavromaras (2003),
interpreting this term as a pure endowment effect is equal to treating the λs as real data.
However, the IMR are estimates themselves and ”the variables used for the estimation
could be a source of indirect discrimination” (Mavromaras, 2003, p. 61). To decompose
this endowment component, a counterfactual has to be constructed, representing the mean
values of the IMR if group 2 would pass through the same selection (into employment)
process as group 1:
λ̂02 =
φ(Z̄ ′2γ̂1)
Φ(Z̄ ′2γ̂1)
. (6.11)
Thus, λ̂02 is a combination of data used in group’s 2 employment equation and coefficients
estimated in the employment equation of group 1. Expanding the endowment term by the
counterfactual evaluated by the non-discriminatory norm θ∗ leads to:
θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂2) = θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂02) + θ∗(λ̂02 − λ̂2). (6.12)
The first term of the right-hand side compares different characteristics in the same en-
vironment, so clearly this is the part that can be explained by the data. The second
term compares a hypothetical situation, namely how would group 2 have been treated
in a group 1 environment, with the actual treatment of group 2. This part therefore can
be attributed to discriminatory behaviour. Since these effects already arise at the selec-
tion (into employment) stage, but also affect the wage, they are labelled indirect effects
(Mavromaras and Rudolph, 1997).
Hence, when estimating selectivity corrected wage equations and applying the pooled
8Parameters estimated from a pooled sample are denoted by an asterisk.
9Both Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) and Mavromaras (2003) make use of results obtained by Gomulka
and Stern (1990), who introduced the decomposition of non-linear terms.
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sample as the non-discriminatory set, the final decomposition equation equals:
Ȳ1 − Ȳ2 = β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′ + X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗) + X̄ ′2(β∗ − β̂2) + (6.13)
θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂02) + θ∗(λ̂02 − λ̂2) + λ̂1(θ̂1 − θ∗) + λ̂2(θ∗ − θ̂2).
The first three terms of the right-hand side are familiar from standard decomposition
approach. All other terms are related to the employment process. Terms 4 and 5 reveal
the extent of indirect endowment and discrimination, resulting from the decomposition
of the λs. Following Mavromaras (2003), the sum of the last two terms corresponds to
the degree to which individuals with identical λs may be remunerated differently upon
employment by group affiliation. Different treatment of identical traits is a clear sign
of discrimination. As shown in Table 6.1, which summarises all individual terms with
their particular interpretation, these effects will be subsumed in the overpayment and
underpayment component.
Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) suggest an identical decomposition of the selection term,
except for the non-discriminatory norm. They assumed β∗ = β1 and consequently θ
∗ = θ1,
which leads to the fact that terms 2 and 6 of equation (6.13) are equal to zero. But
also their interpretation of the remaining terms differs slightly. Terms 4 and 5 are also
interpreted as endowment and discrimination effects, but not labelled as indirectly. If
the selection term is decomposed, both terms are included in the overall endowment and
market components of the observed wage gap. The focus, however, is on the allocation of
the last term which now equals λ̂2(θ̂1 − θ̂2) and in the authors’ view captures ”the effects
of [...] [group] differences in the wage response to the probability of [...] employment”
(Neuman and Oaxaca, 1998, p. 6). The paper then discusses, under what assumptions
this term can either be assigned to the estimated endowment or discrimination effect, or
is to be presented as a separate selectivity contribution. As a fourth strategy, the selection
term is not decomposed at all, but presented as a individual component of the wage gap,
as done in equation (6.9).
How will the various decomposition and allocation strategies affect our impression
of labour market discrimination in South Africa? To answer this question, the observed
wage gaps will be decomposed according to both the standard OLS-based approach and
the selectivity corrected approach. In either setup, estimations from pooled samples are
assumed to reflect an environment without discrimination. Regarding the selection term,
it will be presented as a separated term as in equation (6.9) (Variant 1). Secondly, a
detailed decomposition of the overall wage gap similar to equation (6.13) will be shown.
A third variant follows the idea of having a single selectivity contribution.
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6.2 The South African Labour Force, 1995 - 1999
Before presenting the results of the various estimations and decompositions, it is necessary
to have a closer look at the data used in the analysis. Tables 6.2 to 6.5 present summary
statistics of the population groups. The total sample of labour force participants comprises
individuals who are aged between 15 and 65 and either reported to be employed or were
categorised as unemployed using the expanded definition.10 To belong to the sample of
workers, people had to be employed full-time at a formal sector job.11 Finally, outliers
at both lower and upper end of the wage distribution were excluded from the overall
analysis.12
The information provided by the summary statistics are rather manifold. I will there-
fore only comment on particular findings which point out important differences between
race and gender on the one hand and labour force participants and workers on the other
hand. To start with the educational level, the proxy for human capital, the average num-
ber of years of schooling completed slightly increases for all population groups over the
total period considered. The racial difference in education is significant in both work-
ers and total sample and relatively constant over time.13 Gender differences within each
population group are almost negligible, except for African workers. In all years, African
female workers have considerably more education than African male workers. This result
is remarkable, and was also found in other studies (Erichsen and Wakeford, 2001). It sug-
gests, that only very well educated African women are able to find full-time employment
in the formal sector.
There are also major differences regarding household composition. Racial comparisons
show that in all years the number of children living within the household is somewhat
higher for Africans. Again, there is virtually no gender difference within the White pop-
ulation, but not so for the African population. In both samples (labour force and work-
ers), more children live with African women. With respect to household head, men take
predominantly this position. However, the proportion of African female workers acting
as household head is considerably higher in all years as the corresponding numbers for
White females – a fact that also stresses the particular role of African women in the South
African labour market.
10In 1995, the upper limit with respect to age is 64 due to the limited availability of unemployment
variables.
11To get classified as working full-time it was not sufficient to affirm the corresponding question but
the reported number of hours worked per week had to lie between 35 and 70 as well.
12The number of unreasonable high and low wages increased somewhat over the years. In 1999, alto-
gether 84 observations were dropped from the analysis, 73 of them concerning Africans.
13Another aspect regarding educational attainment is quality of schooling. During Apartheid, separate
educational systems existed for the four population groups. They differed in enrollment rates, pupil-
teacher ratios and financial resources. If quality of schooling is controlled for, racial gaps in labour market
outcomes can be ’explained’ much better (Case and Deaton, 1999; Kingdon and Knight, 2002).
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With respect to the marital status of economically active population, the percentage
of married people is higher among Whites at any point in time, but the share is declining
for all groups. Moving from labour market participants to workers, the portion of married
people increases for all population groups, with the least change for Whites and the most
significant increase for African men. It seems that if African men are married, they have
to find employment to be able to support their families.
There are also important geographical differences. The share of people living in rural
areas is considerably higher among Africans, which is one of the legacies of Apartheid.
Regarding the distribution across provinces, 25 per cent of African and up to 45 per cent
of White labour market participants live in Gauteng, the smallest, but in terms of finding
employment a province with good prospects. Together with Western Cape it has one of
the lowest regional unemployment rates and highest average earnings in South Africa
(Klasen and Woolard, 1999; Stats SA, 2000).
Turning to the distribution across different occupations and industries, racial as well as
gender segmentation is obvious but there also seems to be some mobility. For example, the
share of Africans employed as skilled workers increased for women and even more for men
in the period. Among the latter, the share of unskilled workers also dropped considerably,
whereas for female workers this percentage is unchanged. In 1999, more than one third
of African females were still employed as unskilled. Such jobs are mostly provided by the
service sector, the industry where almost 50 per cent of African females are employed.
On the other hand, the share of Africans working in responsible and well paid jobs like
managers and professionals is still small, but increased slightly.14 Already in 1995, the
majority of Whites was employed in more ’prestigious’ jobs, but the portion of White
women working as managers and professionals amounted to 11 per cent only. In 1999, the
gender gap among Whites regarding such positions was still considerable, but the female
share has come to 27 per cent.
On an industrial level, mobility is also visible, although not that dynamic. The share
of African men employed in agriculture seems to have dropped quite dramatically from
20 per cent in 1995 to only 12 per cent in 1999.15 The share of Africans working in
the financial sector increased somewhat. Most African females are working in the service
sector. Regarding White workers, more and more were employed in the financial sector. At
the same time, about one third of White women and one fifth of White men also earned
their money in the service sector.
14Looking at African women, it seems that the data for 1997 are partly flawed by showing a relatively
big increase of female professionals when compared to 1995 and 1999. The share of women working as
technicians in 1997 seems to be too low when compared to adjacent years.
15Again, the 1997 data might be problematic. Comparing 1995 and 1997, the drop of African male
workers employed in agriculture is even more pronounced, compensated by an alleged rise in 1999. The
portion of African men working in the manufacturing sector records an increase in 1997, and falls back
in 1999 to the same level as already quoted four years ago.
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The dependent variable in all regressions is log of gross hourly wage. This variable had
to be calculated from the reported amount of income and the number of hours worked per
week. People could either report total pay before tax or deductions (including overtime,
allowances, and bonuses) or indicate an income category, i.e. the variable takes the form of
both point and interval data. The appropriate econometric approach would be to estimate
interval regressions. As the estimation of selectivity corrected interval regression has not
been documented so far, I had to proceed differently. If only an income category was
given, I calculated gender and race specific mean values for each income category from
observations that specified the exact amount. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that the proportion
of workers reporting income categories is increasing. In 1997, almost 60 per cent of White
full-time workers employed in the formal sector did not report their actual amount of
income and their share increases to more than 70 per cent in 1999. For African workers
there is also a rising tendency for indicating income category only, but with 31 per cent in
1997 and 39 per cent in 1999 the share remains substantially smaller. Assuming that the
preference to report only an income class is not randomly distributed, the replacement
approach is not beyond question. By including a dummy variable in the wage regressions
I hope to have accounted for this problem.
The average gross wage earned per hour and the corresponding log values increased for
all groups for the period considered. Racial differences are slightly decreasing, but are still
considerable for all years. On average, log hourly wages earned by Whites are more than
one and a half times higher than Africans. Among White workers men earn considerably
more than women. In case of African workers the gender gap is narrower. Probably the
most surprising result, however, is that according to the data, in 1995 African women
who were full-time employed in the formal sector had on average higher wages than their
male colleagues. Due to a jump of men’s wages from Rand 8.6 (1995) to Rand 9.9 (1997),
for the last two years the gender gap among African workers is as expected: men have on
average higher earnings than women. Erichsen and Wakeford (2001) also report male and
female wages disaggregated by population group in 1995. They find the same pattern. This
finding, however, is rather unrealistic and probably due to incorrect numbers regarding
wages for African men in 1995.
Finally, a few words on how the variables are used. Age, educational level, current job
tenure, union membership, living in a rural or urban area and a set of dummy variables
controlling for different occupations, industries, and regions enter the wage regressions.
However, variables like age, education, and living in a rural area are also supposed to
determine employment. To solve the identification problem, the employment equation
must also include variables which are supposed to influence only the probability of being
employed. Household variables are often said to fulfill this exclusion restriction. I will use
the marital status, number of children living in the household, annual gross income earned
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by spouse or partner, and whether individual i is head of household.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Wage Regressions
Ordinary Least Squares Wage Regressions
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present regression results obtained by estimating OLS wage regressions.
The coefficients are mainly in accordance with the literature on wage determination and
are similar to the ones obtained from previous studies on the South African labour mar-
ket (e.g. Rospabe, 2002; Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000a). With respect to age, one
would expect that as a worker gets older she is more experienced which will result in a
higher wage.16 However, due to depreciation this relationship is rather concave than linear,
leading to a turning point in the wage-experience profile. This pattern can be observed
for nearly all population groups in all years, whereas the importance of this relationship
seems to be stronger for men.
Estimated coefficients for Africans indicate that more education leads to higher wages.
Results are statistically significant for both sexes in all years. Returns to schooling are
higher for women. Regarding White men, the coefficients for 1995 and 1997 are also
statistically significant and suggest a dramatic decline in returns to education between
these two years. Results for 1999 are insignificant as are all coefficients for White female
workers.17
Tenure in current job is used to measure firm-specific human capital. Here, a similar
relationship as with age is expected. The longer a person is working with her current
employer, the more firm-specific knowledge she could accumulate, the higher her wage.
Again, this relationship is assumed to be nonlinear because of depreciation of that capital.
Estimation results for African workers strongly confirm such a relationship for all years.
In case of White workers, it only shows up in 1995.
Union membership is supposed to have a positive effect on wage levels, because unions
have a more powerful position in the wage bargaining process (e.g. Butcher and Rouse,
2001; Azam and Rospabe, 1999). This result is strongly confirmed for African workers for
all years but there is no significant association for White workers. This might be partly
due to the somewhat lower rate of unionised workers among Whites.
16In the following, wage is used as an abbreviation for the dependent variable which is log of gross
hourly wage.
17There is probably too little variation across the educational level of Whites to arrive at significant
results.
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If jobs in rural areas are limited and labour supply is relatively large, respectively,
one would expect wage levels to be compressed (see also Bergmann, 1974). Since the
percentage of White workers living in rural areas is relatively small, African workers
should be mostly affected by that. The estimation results confirm exactly this hypothesis.
In case of African workers, residing in a rural area is strongly associated with lower wages,
but for Whites no statistically significant results could be obtained.
Occupational dummy variables reveal that among Africans unskilled workers earn on
average the lowest wages in all three years. For Whites, this statement is true for the
year 1995 and for White men in 1997. Regarding this population group in 1999, being
employed in more prestigious jobs like managers, professionals, and technicians was still
associated with higher wages on average, but with respect to other positions no significant
difference to the mean wage earned by unskilled workers is identified. However, this result,
as well as the insignificant coefficients obtained for White women in 1997 and 1999 may
be due to the relatively small number of observations within each occupational category.
On the industrial level, sectors like agriculture and trade are characterised by the lowest
mean wages for almost all population groups for the period considered. With respect to
other sectors, differences in mean wages in comparison to the average wage earned in the
manufacturing sector are usually either relatively small or statistically not significant.
There is an ongoing debate in the decomposition literature, whether or not occupa-
tional and industrial dummy variables should be included in wage regressions (e.g. Blau,
Ferber, and Winkler, 1998; Brown, Moon, and Zoloth, 1980). Considering such variables in
the estimation increases the share of the observed wage gap that is explained by observable
factors. If occupational (and industrial) segregation is due to discriminatory behaviour,
however, the extent of discrimination will be underestimated. I still include these control
variables to be able to compare my results to other studies on wage discrimination in
South Africa.
With respect to provinces, wages earned in Gauteng and Western Cape are frequently
found to be considerably higher on average than the mean wage in KwaZulu-Natal, the
reference region. African workers living in the Free State are at the bottom end of regional
mean wages for all years. In case of White workers, regional differences are mostly not
statistically significant.
Between 1997 and 1999, significance as well as magnitude of the coefficients on whether
or not income was reported in categories are increasing. This confirms the hypothesis that
people do not randomly report income categories instead of actual amounts. Statistically
significant coefficients had a positive sign, suggesting the distribution of log wages had
been shifted to the right. This bias has been deliberately introduced by the replacement
procedure. To assess, whether the overall results are affected by this approach, I estimated
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also interval regressions, the appropriate estimation method given the particular structure
of the data. Results suggest that the influence of the bias on both the magnitude of the
predicted wage gaps as well as the resulting decomposition components is only marginal.
I therefore proceed with the replacement approach.
Selectivity Corrected Wage Regressions
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present estimation results obtained by the selectivity corrected wage
regressions. The upper panels show results for the wage equations now augmented by
the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda). Estimated coefficients of the employment equation are
shown in the lower panels. The results regarding the IMR support the chosen estima-
tion method as in all regressions statistically significant coefficients have been identified.
Conceptually, the IMR is a monotonically decreasing function of the probability of being
full-time employed in the formal sector, i.e. for individuals who have a high probability,
the IMR will be low. In addition to being highly significant, all coefficients of the IMR
have a negative sign, indicating that people with higher employment propensities also
have above average wage prospects.
Comparing the coefficients of the selectivity corrected wage equations with those ob-
tained by OLS regressions, there are several things to comment on. Significance and, to
a lesser degree, magnitude of the coefficients of variables considered in the wage equation
only did not change, as expected. Variables assumed to influence both wage level and
propensity of being employed, now seem to play only a minor and sometimes less signifi-
cant role on the wage determination process. In terms of being employed these variables
do not turn out to be significant for all population groups. For instance, age seems to
be important for African people but not for Whites. The relationship between age and
employment status is similar to the one identified for wages: the elder a person, the higher
her propensity of being employed, but at a decreasing rate.
Similar results are obtained with respect to education. Only among Africans, with the
exception of men in 1995, a positive effect of more schooling on being employed could be
identified. The insignificant coefficients for Whites should probably not be interpreted in
the sense that education does not effect employment probabilities, but may in turn be
caused by too little variance.
With respect to living in a rural or urban area, there are some important differences
between employment and wage equation. While the wage level for Whites is never signif-
icantly affected by this variable, men have a lower propensity of finding full-time formal
sector employment when living in rural areas in all years. For White women, this result
is only found in 1997. Looking at Africans, statistically significant coefficients could only
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be detected in 1995 and 1997. For women, living in a rural area significantly lowers their
propensity of finding employment, as it is the case for African men in 1997. In 1995,
the relatively large share of male workers employed in agriculture might have caused the
statistically significant positive coefficient for that particular year.
Turning to variables assumed to determine employment only, it is noticeable that they
affect different groups in different ways. In 1995, married women had a lower propensity of
being employed. This is in line with the literature on labour markets. Married women are
supposed to have higher reservation wages as they are more likely specialised in household
production, for example to take care of children (e.g. Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998).
However, in subsequent years, this effect becomes insignificant for both races. Regarding
men, one would expect that being husband will lead to higher employment propensity,
because traditionally they are the main earner. In case of African men, the results do
confirm this, but for White men, the expected effect can only be shown in 1997.
The results for the number of children living in the household may be partly in contrast
to the things just said. Following the above argument, the association with the employment
probability of women should be negative and regarding men, a positive coefficient is
expected. With the exception of White women in 1995, the anticipation is confirmed by
the regressions ran for females. However, the coefficients for men are either insignificant
or negative as well. To explore this interesting relationship further, household structure
and other income sources should be investigated in more detail.
Finally, two control variables are left, which have rather homogenous effects on em-
ployment across all population groups. Regardless of gender, acting as head of household is
often supposed to lead to a higher employment propensity. The particular coefficient cor-
responds in nearly all cases to this expectation, but as Klasen and Woolard (2000) show,
the causality can also run the opposite way.18 With respect to gross income of spouse or
partner statistically significant positive coefficients support the positive assortative mat-
ing theory, arguing that people who have similar educational levels and therefore similar
employment prospects tend to live together (e.g. Becker, 1991).
6.3.2 Decomposition Results
Tables 6.10 to 6.13 present the decomposition results for all comparisons. The non-
discriminatory norm is assumed to be reflected by a pooled sample approach, comprising
the two groups under consideration. The first panel of each table presents decomposition
components resulting from the estimation of OLS wage regressions. Variant 1 adds the
18Excluding this control variable does not change overall results.
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selection term which is wholly decomposed in the next panel (Variant 2). Finally, by al-
locating indirect effects to overall endowment and discrimination components and being
left with the selectivity component as a separate contribution to the overall wage gap,
one of the decomposition strategies suggested by Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) is applied
in Variant 3.
It seems helpful to think about changes that could occur when turning from the
standard to the selectivity corrected approach. If we assume that all variables which
affect the wage are considered in the wage equations, the productivity component is
not expected to change. But the unexplained proportion could change in several ways.
It could stay unchanged, leaving the selection term close to zero suggesting different
selection into employment is not an issue. The discrimination term itself could become
zero, meaning that discrimination takes place only at the hiring stage. Finally, any split of
the amount unexplained by the standard approach between discrimination and selection
term is also possible. Table 6.10 shows the comparison of wages earned by African men and
women. According to the standard decomposition approach (Oaxaca), the unexplained
component, interpreted as total discrimination, reaches alarming dimensions. The further
breakdown into overpayment and underpayment reveals that in 1997 and 1999, almost
two thirds of the discrimination component are due to underpayment of women.19 If
women would have been paid like men, they in fact would have earned higher wages than
men. This is indicated by the endowment component which corresponds to the predicted
wage gap, i.e. the wage differential that should have been observed in the absence of
labour market discrimination. The comparison between standard and selectivity corrected
approaches reveals that African female workers suffer a lot from discrimination that arise
at the selection into employment stage. In other words, it is very hard for them to find
full-time employment in the formal sector and they get paid less for their work, compared
to African men. Both the selection component in Variant 1 and the selectivity component
in Variant 3 are increasing over time suggesting that the women’s situation became even
worse.
Turning to Table 6.11, the inspection of the second gender comparison shows that the
observed wage gap between White men and women was considerably reduced between
1995 and 1997. It remained almost constant after. In 1995, only half of the differential
could be explained by different personal productivity-related characteristics according to
the standard approach and Variant 1. In the last two specifications, the endowment share
is somewhat lower. A common finding across all decompositions is that over time the
19As mentioned before, the observed wage differential in 1995 is probably an aberration caused by too
low wages for men. During a research stay in South Africa, I also consulted experts on this finding. They
basically supported my view. Despite this, I decided to report the numbers as mean wages for men have
been frequently used, but I refrain from interpreting the results in detail.
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explainable parts of the wage gaps became further reduced. Therefore, the good news
of a closing gender wage gap among Whites is diluted by an increasing unexplainable
part of it. If selectivity into employment is controlled for, our impression of labour market
discrimination is changed. For example in 1995, the selection term (Variant 1) and also the
selectivity term (Variant 3) become almost as large as the discrimination component in
the Oaxaca decomposition. This suggests that White women suffer predominantly from
discrimination at the hiring stage. Looking at subsequent years, however, this kind of
discrimination cannot be detected anymore. Results rather suggest that in 1997 selection
into employment was in favour of women (negative selection and selectivity term) and
in 1999, there was virtually no gender difference regarding the hiring process. Of course,
fluctuations of these magnitudes are unlikely and need further investigation.20
Table 6.12 presents the results of the female racial comparison. The observed wage dif-
ferential is steadily increasing. In 1997, White women earned on average more than twice
as much as African women. However, due to relatively large differences in productivity-
related characteristics predicted wage gaps in all specifications are also large and in-
creasing. Consequently, the extent of discrimination is relatively small. According to the
standard approach, in all years it amounts to circa 30 per cent and occurs predominantly
in terms of overpayment of White women. Applying the selectivity corrected approach
leads to considerable selection terms (Variant 1). In 1997 and 1999, the selection terms
exceed the unexplained part of the standard approach by far. This is only possible if the
extent of total discrimination becomes negative. This in turn means that the detected
amount of discrimination is no longer widening but reducing the wage differential.21 As
many components turn out to be rather volatile, it seems inappropriate to exactly in-
terpret the numbers shown. But two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, when compared
to White women, African women seem to be especially disadvantaged in terms of find-
ing full-time formal sector employment. Secondly, this kind of discrimination is becoming
larger over time.
Table 6.13 provides the results for the second racial comparison. Wage differentials
between African and White male workers are the largest observed.22 Compared to the
discussion of female wage differentials, a number of similarities are found. The overall
wage gap is also widening between 1997 and 1999. Starting with the Oaxaca decomposi-
tion, large differences in mean characteristics result in large predicted wage gaps. In all
20The variability of particular terms over time has to be attributed rather to changing coefficients of
the men’s inverse Mills ratio than to the IMR itself. A semiparametric estimation may perform better in
this context (see also Newey, Powell, and Walker, 1990).
21Again, the rather restrictive estimation approach applied is surely contributing to this finding. For
example, the relatively large increase of the selection term when going from 1995 to 1997 is mainly due
to changing coefficients of African women’s IMR and not to a change in the IMR itself.
22Again, the 1995 numbers will not be discussed in detail.
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years, the unexplained portion amounts to around 40 per cent and can be largely ascribed
to overpayment of White workers. Looking at the results obtained from the selectivity
corrected approach reveals that African men experience a different kind of racial dis-
crimination than African women. In 1997 and 1999, selection and selectivity terms have
negative signs. This implies that for African men it is relatively easy to find employment
in comparison to White men. However, once they are employed, they experience more
discrimination than was detected by the standard approach.
To conclude the empirical analysis, I will shortly review both the methods applied
and the main findings. Estimation results obtained from selectivity corrected wage re-
gressions strongly confirm that selectivity into employment exists in the South African
labour market. Individuals do have different probabilities of finding full-time formal sector
employment. As Rospabe (2002, 2001a) shows, racial and gender differences in employ-
ment probability can only partly be explained by differences in observable characteristics.
It is thus possible to conclude that discriminatory behaviour occurs at the hiring stage.
The question then arises whether this kind of discrimination also affects wages and hence
wage differentials. Mavromaras (2003) and Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) suggest similar
decomposition techniques that help to answer this question.
Decomposing wage differentials estimated by selectivity corrected wage regressions
leads at first to one additional term, called selection term, which incorporates the inverse
Mills ratio. Analogously to the standard decomposition approach, the selection term can
be decomposed into an explained and unexplained component. However, the IMR are
estimates themselves and they may reflect discriminatory behaviour at the hiring stage.
With the help of a counterfactual it is possible to detect whether or not the ’explained’
component arising from the decomposition of the selection term is really fully explained
by different personal characteristics. Neither Mavromaras (2003) nor Neuman and Oaxaca
(1998) preferred a particular way how to allocate the additional terms but offered several
options. I presented three alternatives. Generally spoken, they suggested similarly ten-
dencies. In addition, I also decomposed the wage differentials according to the standard
approach to see whether the two approaches arrive at different results.
The extent of labour market discrimination determined by the standard decomposi-
tion approach corresponds to results of other studies (e.g. Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks,
2000a; Rospabe, 2002, 2001a). Once differences in employment probability are taken into
account, the appearance of discrimination changes. It has been shown that African women
suffer particularly from discrimination at the hiring stage when compared to African men.
But also when compared to White women, they face this kind of discrimination. African
men, on the contrary, were found to have relatively easy access to the labour market but
encounter considerable direct wage discrimination in comparison to White men. Regard-
ing the gender gap among Whites, good and bad news can be told. The overall wage gap
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decreased especially between 1995 and 1997. However, the extent of direct wage discrim-
ination was found to have increased.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
To expect that only few years after the official end of Apartheid disparities in employment,
earnings, and occupations could have been substantially reduced is of course unrealistic.
But since 1994, a number of fundamental labour market reforms have been introduced
which explicitly aim for improving the situation of previously disadvantaged population
groups.23 It therefore seems natural to ask whether labour market outcomes have been
sensitive to the change in legislation.
The existence of racial but also gender discrimination in labour market outcomes has
been documented in previous studies (e.g. Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000b; Sherer,
2000; Rospabe, 2001a). To determine the extent of discrimination, the standard decom-
position approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) or slight modifications of it have been
applied. This work proceeded differently. By jointly considering employment propensity
and wage determination it is possible to determine indirect effects arising at the hiring
stage but also influencing the wage rate (Mavromaras, 2003; Neuman and Oaxaca, 1998).
A comparison between the standard approach and the selectivity corrected decomposition
approach allows to assess whether the appearance of wage discrimination changed over
time.
The need to reduce wage inequality between Africans and Whites has been explicitly
addressed by labour market legislation (Preamble of Employment Equity Act 1998). Re-
garding the sample of workers that I focused on, racial wage gaps between men and women
were found to have increased between 1995 and 1999. Large differences in productivity-
related characteristics account for a considerable proportion of the wage differentials.
Therefore, promoting the accumulation of human capital and developing skills among
disadvantaged population groups will help to close the existing gap. On the other hand,
for the unexplained amount of the wage gaps, interpreted as discrimination, neither for
women nor for men a declining tendency could be detected. Instead, the extent of discrim-
ination either remained relatively constant or was even growing. Results obtained from
the selectivity corrected approach furthermore showed that African women increasingly
23For example, the Labour Relations Act 1995 regulating trade unions registration and collective bar-
gaining; The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 which establishes standards regarding the con-
ditions of employment; The Employment Equity Act 1998 which prohibits unfair discrimination and
commit employers to implement affirmative action measures; The Skills Development Act 1998 which
provides an institutional framework to develop and improve the skills of the South African workforce.
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suffer from discrimination at the hiring stage. The opposite is found for African men. As
indicated by negative selection terms, they enjoy relatively easy access to formal sector
employment in comparison to White men. According to the approach correcting for dif-
ferent employment probabilities, the extent of discrimination African men face once they
are employed turns out to be larger than the corresponding magnitude determined by the
standard approach.
Gender differences in labour market outcomes in South Africa have attracted less
attention so far. The results obtained here largely confirm the findings from Rospabe
(2001a). Gender wage differentials are considerably smaller for Africans and Whites than
racial gaps. However, the extent of discrimination is comparatively large and was growing
between 1995 and 1999. Therefore, it is also important to investigate the unexplained
gender gap further to suggest appropriate policy measures. Again, the selectivity corrected
approach hints at where discrimination predominantly takes places. For African women
increasing discrimination when entering employment is found, whereas White women are
more affected by direct wage discrimination.
The analysis demonstrated that in the second half of the 1990s labour market discrim-
ination by race and gender was still substantial. As discrimination can arise at different
stages, it is necessary to get a detailed understanding of the barriers that exist in the
labour market and how they affect particular groups of workers. But not only labour
market legislation is in charge, also macroeconomic policy must address the need of the
South African labour market by promoting growth which eventually will also stimulate
the labour market.
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Table 6.1: Decomposition Terms and Interpretation
Oaxaca
Endowment β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′
Total Discrimination
Overpayment X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗)
Underpayment X̄ ′2(β
∗ − β̂2)
Variant 1
Endowment β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′
Total Discrimination
Overpayment X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗)
Underpayment X̄ ′2(β
∗ − β̂2)
Selection (θ̂1λ̂1 − θ̂2λ̂2)
Variant 2
Total Endowment
Direct Endowment β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′
Indirect Endowment θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂02)
Total Discrimination
Overpayment X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗) + λ̂1(θ̂1 − θ∗)
Underpayment X̄ ′2(β
∗ − β̂2) + λ̂2(θ∗ − θ̂2)
Indirect Discrimination θ∗(λ̂02 − λ̂2)
Variant 3
Total Endowment
Direct Endowment β∗(X̄1 − X̄2)′
Indirect Endowment θ∗(λ̂1 − λ̂02)
Total Discrimination
Overpayment X̄ ′1(β̂1 − β∗)
Underpayment X̄ ′2(β
∗ − β̂2)
Indirect Discrimination θ∗(λ̂02 − λ̂2)
Selectivity λ̂1(θ̂1 − θ∗) + λ̂2(θ∗ − θ̂2)
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Table 6.5: continued
1995 1997 1999
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Trade 0.22 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16
Transport 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.10
Finance 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.13 0.29 0.19
Services 0.34 0.22 0.38 0.20 0.34 0.19
Province
Western Cape 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19
Eastern Cape 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08
Northern Cape 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Free State 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
North West 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04
Gauteng 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.43
Mpumalanga 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07
Northern Province 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
KwaZulu-Natal 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.06
N 1,119 1,729 834 1,250 751 948
Population 363,160 546,351 417,990 645,301 423,702 517,070
Notes: See Table 6.4.
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Table 6.6: continued
1995 1997 1999
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Province
Western Cape 0.08 (0.07) -0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.08) -0.08 (0.05) 0.20∗∗ (0.07) 0.15∗∗ (0.05)
Eastern Cape -0.11∗∗ (0.04) -0.17∗∗ (0.03) 0.02 (0.05) -0.12∗∗ (0.04) -0.23∗∗ (0.06) -0.27∗∗ (0.05)
Northern Cape -0.29∗∗ (0.11) -0.12∗∗ (0.05) -0.11 (0.11) -0.09 (0.06) -0.13 (0.09) 0.02 (0.06)
Free State -0.52∗∗ (0.04) -0.56∗∗ (0.02) -0.22∗∗ (0.05) -0.28∗∗ (0.04) -0.43∗∗ (0.05) -0.25∗∗ (0.04)
North West -0.04 (0.04) -0.17∗∗ (0.03) 0.04 (0.05) -0.14∗∗ (0.03) 0.00 (0.05) -0.05 (0.04)
Gauteng 0.18∗∗ (0.04) 0.00 (0.03) 0.21∗∗ (0.04) 0.07∗ (0.03) 0.15∗∗ (0.05) 0.04 (0.04)
Mpumalanga -0.06 (0.04) -0.11∗∗ (0.03) -0.11∗ (0.05) -0.18∗∗ (0.03) -0.01 (0.05) -0.02 (0.04)
Northern Province 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05) -0.13∗∗ (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) -0.06 (0.04)
Intercept 0.63∗∗ (0.15) 0.58∗∗ (0.10) 0.97∗∗ (0.18) 0.73∗∗ (0.13) 0.42∗ (0.20) 0.56∗∗ (0.14)
N 2,971 6,873 3,193 6,023 2,678 4,999
R2 0.65 0.68 0.48 0.43 0.61 0.51
Notes: Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%; Standard errors in parentheses.
Reference categories: Educational level: No and primary education; Occupation: Unskilled worker; Industry: Manufacturing; Province: KwaZulu-Natal.
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Table 6.9: continued
1995 1997 1999
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Province
Western Cape 0.05 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) -0.12 (0.10) -0.05 (0.09) 0.39∗∗ (0.12) 0.16 (0.11)
Eastern Cape -0.05 (0.06) -0.04 (0.05) -0.04 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12) 0.22 (0.13) -0.12 (0.11)
Northern Cape -0.16∗ (0.07) -0.13 (0.07) -0.55∗∗ (0.12) -0.15 (0.11) 0.13 (0.15) -0.02 (0.13)
Free State 0.00 (0.06) -0.02 (0.05) -0.13 (0.12) -0.26∗ (0.11) 0.08 (0.13) -0.06 (0.11)
North West -0.08 (0.06) 0.00 (0.05) -0.47∗∗ (0.13) -0.46∗∗ (0.11) 0.16 (0.15) 0.00 (0.13)
Gauteng 0.20∗∗ (0.04) 0.18∗∗ (0.04) -0.05 (0.09) -0.02 (0.08) 0.36∗∗ (0.11) 0.03 (0.10)
Mpumalanga 0.02 (0.07) 0.14∗ (0.06) -0.41∗∗ (0.13) -0.07 (0.10) 0.25 (0.14) 0.04 (0.12)
Northern Province 0.10 (0.08) 0.02 (0.07) -0.17 (0.20) -0.32 (0.17) 0.18 (0.14) -0.29∗ (0.14)
Intercept 1.11∗∗ (0.41) -1.69∗∗ (0.41) 1.46∗∗ (0.49) 1.47∗∗ (0.46) 1.91∗∗ (0.63) 2.60∗∗ (0.74)
Employment equation
Age -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.08∗∗ (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.04∗ (0.02)
Age squared 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗ (0.00) 0.00∗∗ (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00∗∗ (0.00)
Secondary education 0.54 (0.55) 0.75 (0.41) 0.36 (0.36) 0.18 (0.32) 0.56 (0.49) 0.71 (0.62)
Tertiary education 0.30 (0.55) 0.54 (0.41) 0.18 (0.37) 0.08 (0.32) 0.45 (0.49) 0.61 (0.62)
Rural -0.14 (0.08) -0.35∗∗ (0.05) -0.48∗∗ (0.16) -0.59∗∗ (0.11) -0.15 (0.10) -0.46∗∗ (0.08)
Married -0.37∗∗ (0.08) -0.06 (0.07) -0.20∗ (0.10) 0.23∗ (0.10) 0.19 (0.09) -0.15 (0.09)
Income spouse 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.02∗∗ (0.00) 0.00∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗ (0.00) 0.01∗∗ (0.00)
Nr. children -0.05 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) -0.17∗∗ (0.04) -0.06∗ (0.03) -0.22∗∗ (0.04) -0.02 (0.03)
Head of Household 0.21∗ (0.09) 0.10 (0.08) 0.25∗ (0.11) 0.17 (0.11) 0.51∗∗ (0.11) 0.48∗∗ (0.09)
Intercept -0.08 (0.61) -1.04∗ (0.48) -1.34∗∗ (0.52) -0.07 (0.48) -0.71 (0.62) -1.48∗ (0.70)
Lambda -0.38∗∗ (0.06) -0.17∗∗ (0.05) -0.34∗ (0.16) -0.67∗∗ (0.16) -0.48∗∗ (0.10) -0.46∗∗ (0.09)
N 2,657 3,863 1,496 2,064 1,647 2,136
χ2 665 1,519 263 419 268 553
Notes: See Table 6.6.
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Table 6.10: Decomposition Analysis: African Men versus African Women
1995 1997 1999
Wage Differential -0.1799 0.1203 0.1294
Oaxaca
Endowment -0.3429 -0.1087 -0.0757
Total Discrimination 0.1630 0.2290 0.2051
Overpayment 0.0492 0.0793 0.0716
Underpayment 0.1138 0.1496 0.1336
Variant 1
Endowment -0.2883 -0.0519 -0.0033
Total Discrimination -0.3586 -0.6323 -0.7709
Overpayment -0.1211 -0.2161 -0.2615
Underpayment -0.2376 -0.4161 -0.5093
Selection 0.4670 0.8044 0.9036
Variant 2
Endowment -0.2296 -0.0047 0.0747
Direct Endowment -0.2883 -0.0519 -0.0033
Indirect Endowment 0.0587 0.0472 0.0780
Total Discrimination 0.0496 0.1249 0.0547
Overpayment -0.0785 -0.0504 -0.0569
Underpayment 0.0071 0.0419 0.0410
Indirect Discrimination 0.1211 0.1335 0.0706
Variant 3
Endowment -0.2296 -0.0047 0.0747
Total Discrimination -0.2376 -0.4988 -0.7002
Overpayment -0.1211 -0.2161 -0.2615
Underpayment -0.2376 -0.4161 -0.5093
Indirect Discrimination 0.1211 0.1335 0.0706
Selectivity 0.2872 0.6237 0.7549
Wage differential equals log(Ȳmen)− log(Ȳwomen).
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Table 6.11: Decomposition Analysis: White Men versus White Women
1995 1997 1999
Wage Differential 0.5137 0.3352 0.3350
Oaxaca
Endowment 0.2589 0.1334 0.1372
Total Discrimination 0.2549 0.2018 0.1978
Overpayment 0.1001 0.0808 0.0874
Underpayment 0.1547 0.1210 0.1104
Variant 1
Endowment 0.2595 0.1850 0.1472
Total Discrimination 0.0390 0.3396 0.1840
Overpayment -0.0815 -0.1283 0.0156
Underpayment 0.1205 0.4680 0.1684
Selection 0.2153 -0.1894 0.0039
Variant 2
Endowment 0.2171 0.1470 0.1838
Direct Endowment 0.2595 0.1850 0.1472
Indirect Endowment -0.0424 -0.0381 0.0366
Total Discrimination 0.2966 0.1883 0.1513
Overpayment 0.0837 -0.0001 0.0749
Underpayment 0.1496 0.0849 0.1266
Indirect Discrimination 0.0633 0.1034 -0.0502
Variant 3
Endowment 0.2171 0.1470 0.1838
Total Discrimination 0.1023 0.4431 0.1337
Overpayment -0.0815 -0.1283 0.0156
Underpayment 0.1205 0.4680 0.1684
Indirect Discrimination 0.0633 0.1034 -0.0502
Selectivity 0.1944 -0.2548 0.0175
Wage differential equals log(Ȳmen)− log(Ȳwomen).
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Table 6.12: Decomposition Analysis: White Women versus African Women
1995 1997 1999
Wage Differential 0.9301 1.0414 1.1445
Oaxaca
Endowment 0.6511 0.6466 0.8240
Total Discrimination 0.2791 0.3949 0.3206
Overpayment 0.2027 0.3131 0.2504
Underpayment 0.0764 0.0818 0.0702
Variant 1
Endowment 0.7361 0.7237 0.8796
Total Discrimination -0.1736 -0.5033 -0.4993
Overpayment -0.4582 -0.8955 -0.4512
Underpayment 0.2846 0.3922 -0.0481
Selection 0.3677 0.8211 0.7642
Variant 2
Endowment 0.8730 1.0663 1.1796
Direct Endowment 0.7361 0.7237 0.8796
Indirect Endowment 0.1369 0.3426 0.3000
Total Discrimination 0.0572 -0.0248 -0.0351
Overpayment -0.1608 -0.4443 -0.2215
Underpayment 0.0359 0.0312 0.0265
Indirect Discrimination 0.1821 0.3883 0.1600
Variant 3
Endowment 0.8730 1.0663 1.1796
Total Discrimination 0.0085 -0.1150 -0.3393
Overpayment -0.4582 -0.8955 -0.4512
Underpayment 0.2846 -0.3922 -0.0481
Indirect Discrimination 0.1821 0.3883 0.1600
Selectivity 0.0487 0.0902 0.3043
Wage differential equals log(Ȳwhite)− log(Ȳafrican).
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Table 6.13: Decomposition Analysis: White Men versus African Men
1995 1997 1999
Wage Differential 1.6238 1.2564 1.3501
Oaxaca
Endowment 1.0406 0.7506 0.7959
Total Discrimination 0.5832 0.5058 0.5543
Overpayment 0.4660 0.4188 0.4659
Underpayment 0.1172 0.0869 0.0884
Variant 1
Endowment 1.0971 0.7863 0.8261
Total Discrimination 0.4107 0.6428 0.6596
Overpayment 0.0503 0.3330 0.3993
Underpayment 0.3604 0.3099 0.2603
Selection 0.1159 -0.1728 -0.1355
Variant 2
Endowment 1.2907 0.9275 0.9582
Direct Endowment 1.0971 0.7863 0.8261
Indirect Endowment 0.1935 0.1412 0.1320
Total Discrimination 0.3331 0.3289 0.3920
Overpayment 0.4087 0.2072 0.3450
Underpayment 0.1184 0.0764 0.0804
Indirect Discrimination -0.1940 0.0452 -0.0334
Variant 3
Endowment 1.2907 0.9275 0.9582
Total Discrimination 0.2168 0.6881 0.6261
Overpayment 0.0503 0.3330 0.3993
Underpayment 0.3604 0.3099 0.2603
Indirect Discrimination -0.1940 0.0452 -0.0334
Selectivity 0.1164 -0.3592 -0.2341
Wage differential equals log(Ȳwhite)− log(Ȳafrican).
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Part III
The Analysis of Cohort Data
111
Chapter 7
Cross Sections and Synthetic Panel
Data
7.1 On the Limitations of Cross Sectional Data
The previous analysis vividly showed that in the South African labour market the prob-
ability of finding regular employment as well as formal sector wages differ greatly by race
and gender. Differences in measurable personal characteristics could only partly explain
the observed gaps. The magnitude of explainable and unexplainable portions of particu-
lar wage differentials varies with the chosen specification of the wage regression and the
decomposition technique applied. But regarding racial wage gaps between African and
White workers, there is consensus that no declining trend of the unexplained part has
developed in post-Apartheid South Africa until 1999 (e.g. Rospabe, 2002; Allanson and
Atkins, 2001; Erichsen and Wakeford, 2001; Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000a).
Results like this are derived from a conventional decomposition of mean wage differ-
entials. A linear model of wage determination is specified and the ordinary least squares
estimator is used to predict individual wages. But only the average of these predictions is
considered further on in most decomposition analyses, thereby disregarding the existing
heterogeneity among the individuals.1
Studies examining South African labour market outcomes in the second half of the
1990’s are often based on the October Household Survey data. As discussed in chapter
4.2, these are cross sectional data and allow a very detailed description of e.g. the earnings
situation of individual workers in the particular survey year (e.g. Rospabe, 2001b; Allan-
son, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000b). The analysis of subsequent years of the OHS data enables
us to follow particular groups of people and to study changes of regional, occupational,
1An alternative to analyse earnings discrimination is suggested by Jenkins (1994). Following his ap-
proach, the discrimination measurement is not based on mean wages, but takes into consideration the
complete distribution of predicted and reference wages.
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or racial mean wages over time (e.g. Rospabe, 2002; Allanson and Atkins, 2001; Erichsen
and Wakeford, 2001; Allanson, Atkins, and Hinks, 2000a). With cross sectional data at
hand, it is however not possible to follow individual workers. Only panel or longitudinal
data permit to view temporal changes at an individual level, i.e. whether people with
relatively low income still belong to this income group in a later period (Baltagi, 1998;
Deaton, 1997). To evaluate for example the success of anti-poverty strategies it is exactly
such questions that have to be addressed.
The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) partly offers an alternative to
the OHS data. In the province of KwaZulu-Natal, African and Indian households which
took part in the first South African national household survey in 1993, were re-surveyed in
1998.2 The resulting panel was also subject to studies analysing employment and earnings
mobility (e.g. Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt, 2002; Klasen and Woolard, 2002; Keswell,
2000).3 However, as only households residing in that particular province, even though it
is the most populous one, and only two population groups did participate in the survey,
the sample size is rather small. Hence, and to make the following analysis consistent with
the one conducted in Part II, I will not further consider the KIDS data here.
Instead, I will use subsequent years of the OHS to construct cohort data as suggested
by Deaton (1985). Individuals who share particular characteristics (e.g. born in the same
year) are pooled into cohorts and the means for each group are calculated. Applying this
strategy to several survey years allows to follow (birth) cohorts over time and to build up
a synthetic panel. That way, the issues of ignoring the heterogeneity among workers as
well as the inability of studying the dynamic behaviour of individuals are at least partly
tackled. Variables like the mean wage of African women can be split up into several age
groups thereby revealing their contributions to the overall average in one particular year.
These cohort wages of African women can be compared to the corresponding cohort wages
of White women to see how the mean wage differential presented in Part II develop at the
cohort level. As cohorts are tracked for various years, it is now also possible to watch their
earnings mobility. The comparison of such within cohort changes will show whether or not
young and old cohorts develop alongside similar paths. Finally, as different cohorts are
observed at the same age, I will attempt to separate life-cycle from generational effects.
This decomposition results in an age-earnings profile and allows to ascertain the existence
and direction of cohort effects.
2For further information on these data, see May, Carter, Haddad, and Maluccio (2000).
3Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt (2002) found that African workers in KwaZulu-Natal experienced
rather volatile earnings. But not only the extent, also the direction of earnings movements was surprising.
Low-income earners in 1993 had larger gains on average than those who started with relatively high
earnings. Regarding the transition between formal and informal employment it turned out that movements
out of regular employment were frequently accompanied by increases in real earnings.
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7.2 Constructing a Synthetic Panel
To demonstrate, how synthetic panels can be constructed and what potential problems
are associated with this approach, it is helpful to begin at the individual level.4
Consider the linear model:
Yit = X
′
itβ + αi + uit, t = 1, ..., T (7.1)
where subscript i indicates individuals observed over T periods. X ′it is a set of explanatory
variables, β the set of parameters to be estimated, and the error terms with the commonly
assumed properties are given by uit. The αi’s represent unobserved individual effects which
are constant over time, for example inherent ability or motivation. Such individual effects
are likely to be correlated with the regressors.5 As a standard approach the αi’s are
treated like group specific constant terms. Since panel data observe the same individuals
for more than one point in time, these invariant terms can be eliminated by a within or
first difference transformation. The resulting differenced equation is then estimated by
ordinary least squares (Greene, 2000).
Deaton (1985) suggests that to any linear individual relationship, as the one shown in
equation (7.1), there exists a corresponding cohort version. With a series of independent
cross sections being available, it is not possible to follow individuals or particular house-
holds, but to track cohorts over time.6 Cohorts are formed among individuals who have
one or more characteristics in common. Each individual belongs to one cohort only and
this association is constant over time. Aggregating single information to cohort level and
substituting individual observations by the cohort average result in the following model:
Ȳct = X̄ ′ctβ + ᾱct + ūct, c = 1, ..., C, t = 1, ..., T (7.2)
where, for instance, Ȳct is the average value of all observed Yit’s in cohort c at time t.
Regarding individual fixed effects, the aggregation to cohort level leads theoretically to
cohort fixed effects, if a constant (cohort) population is assumed.7 In practice, however,
the average is taken over the surveyed cohort members only. Since for each period different
4The theoretical explanation mainly follows Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Verbeek (1996). For
further discussion see also Deaton (1985, 1997) and Baltagi (1995).
5If individual effects are assumed to be randomly distributed instead, a random effects approach is
applicable, with αi + uit forming a composite error term.
6Early studies of life-cycle models were already based on cohort data but the conducted analysis was
sometimes of a rather descriptive nature (e.g. Shorrocks, 1975).
7This assumption is necessary as consecutive surveys are used to generate random samples from the
same underlying population. In most applications, it is reasonable to suppose an invariant population.
The literature frequently discusses two circumstances that may lead to a violation of this assumption.
Firstly, if an economy is subject to e.g. substantial migration or death rates, the population structure
alters over the years. Secondly, when working with household instead of individual data, cohorts are
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individuals are observed, ᾱct is not constant over time, ”because it is the average of the
fixed effects of different [...] [individuals] in each year” (Deaton, 1997, p. 122). Thus, the
ᾱct’s cannot be cancelled out by a transformation similar to the ones applicable to genuine
panel data.
The time variation of cohort effects is negligible, if the number of observations per
cohort is large. In that case, the model changes to:
Ȳct = X̄ ′ctβ + ᾱc + ūct, c = 1, ..., C, t = 1, ..., T. (7.3)
The resulting pseudo panel consists of T observations on C cohorts and the parameter
vector β could be determined using the standard within estimator β̂w.
Deaton (1985) correctly points to an additional measurement error problem. Depen-
dent and independent variables are measured by the observed cohort means Ȳct and X̄ ′ct
which are error-ridden estimators of the unobservable population cohort means Y ∗ct and
X∗
′
ct . The measurement error on the independent variables causes the estimator to be bi-
ased toward zero. By applying errors-in-variables techniques it is possible to correct for
this. Since the data are available on the individual level, both cohort averages and associ-
ated standard errors can be estimated. The estimated standard errors correspond to the
variance due to measurement error which then has to be subtracted from the classical es-
timator to yield a consistent estimator, the later on so-called Deaton’s errors-in-variables
estimator β̂D.
8
Verbeek (1996) examines the consistency properties of both the within estimator β̂w
and Deaton’s errors-in-variables estimator β̂D with respect to the total number of obser-
vations N , number of cohorts C, number of observations per cohort nc, and periods T .
He concludes that the cohort size nc is crucial for the consistency of the within estimator.
If nc tends to infinity, β̂w and β̂D become equivalents. This finding supports the approach
of many applied papers which argue that if cohort sizes are relatively large, it is possible
to ignore the measurement error and use the standard within estimator.9 But even rela-
tively large cohort sizes may not be sufficient to reduce the bias significantly as shown by
often defined by the age of the household head. However, being head of household is not a constant
characteristic but households get reorganised in case of marriage, divorce, or if old people dissolve their
own household to live with their children (Deaton, 1997; Moffitt, 1993).
8An alternative approach that allows to estimate also dynamic models from a time series of cross-
sections was introduced by Moffitt (1993). He disregards the error-in-variables problem and demonstrates
that repeated cross sectional data can be used to consistently estimate models with lagged endogenous
variables. Since the samples are independently drawn, observed changes in cohort averages are also
independently measured. It is therefore possible to use changes from earlier years as instruments (see also
Deaton, 1997; Verbeek, 1996). For an application of this instrumental variables procedure see for example
Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994).
9See for example Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) with cohort sizes of 190, Deaton and Paxson
(1994a) where nc lies between 150 and 400, Blundell, Meghir, and Neves (1993) who on average have 360
observations per cohort, or Jappelli (1999) grouping up to 700 individual observations.
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Verbeek and Nijman (1992):10
ω = plimC→∞
1
CT
C∑
C=1
T∑
T=1
(X̄ ′ct −X∗
′
ct )
2
=
1
nc
σ2v . (7.4)
To minimise the measurement error variance ω in X̄ ′ct, clearly, a large number of ob-
servations per cohort is necessary. However, the way individuals are aggregated is also
important as it influences σ2v , the within cohort variance. Cohorts should be constructed
such that within-variation is small and between-variation is large. In other words: ”[...]
individuals within each cohort should be as ’homogeneous’ as possible, while those from
different cohorts should be as ’heterogeneous’ as possible” (Verbeek, 1996, p. 284). In ad-
dition, inspecting the standard errors of the cohort means ensures that regression results
are not dominated by the way of sampling (Deaton, 1997).
The number of observations per cohort does not only influence the magnitude of
the measurement error, but also determines the size of the pseudo panel and thus the
variance of the within estimator. An optimal choice of cohort sizes will therefore take
into account consequences for both the bias arising from measurement error and the
variance of the estimator. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) examine the magnitude of these
two opposite effects. They show analytically that an increase in nc finally results in an
increase in the variance of β̂w and confirm this finding by an empirical test.
11 The effect
of a smaller variance if cohort averages are estimated more precisely is more than offset
by an increase in the variance if the estimation has to be based on a smaller total number
of observations. The existing trade-off between cohort size and the number of cohorts is
frequently referred to when discussing the cohort design. In case of the errors-in-variables
estimator it is possible to choose an optimal cohort size, but when relying on the standard
within estimator, one basically has to weigh up the bias with the variance (Verbeek, 1996).
After having explained how pseudo panels can be constructed, it is reasonable to
discuss the usefulness of such strategy. If long series of cross sectional data are available,
this method enables us to study the dynamics of particular age groups. Various estimators
for static and dynamic models have been developed to yield consistent results when applied
to cohort data (see for example Verbeek and Vella, 2000; Collado, 1997; Moffitt, 1993;
Verbeek and Nijman, 1993; Deaton, 1985). From a theoretical point of view, synthetic
panels may be even preferred to genuine panels. The problem of attrition due to mortality,
10For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that cohort sizes are equal (i.e. nc = N/C). Otherwise,
observations have to be weighted by the square root of the cohort size first to obtain a homoscedastic
variance (Greene, 1997; Verbeek and Nijman, 1992).
11As the derivation of this result is rather complex, I refer to Verbeek and Nijman (1992) for a more
detailed discussion. In the empirical part, they analyse food expenditures of Dutch households and come
to the conclusion that ”fairly large cohort sizes (100, 200 individuals) are needed to validly ignore the
cohort nature of the data” (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, p. 20).
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refusal, or mobility let panel data become less representative over the years. Since cross
sectional data are based on a newly drawn sample each time, they better fulfill the criterion
of representativeness.12
From an econometric standpoint, working with grouped data has two major conse-
quences. Parameter estimates are less efficient, since data aggregation leads to a loss of
information.13 The fit of grouped data regressions is considerably higher, sometimes close
to one (Greene, 1997). If the number of observations per group differs considerably, het-
eroscedastic error terms will occur in addition. Weighting the data by the square root of
cohort sizes ensures that the error terms are homoscedastic and thus all assumptions of
the classical linear regression model are met (Deaton, 1985; Greene, 1997).
In the next chapter individual data of African and White workers will be aggregated
to form (birth) cohorts of workers. Compared to the analysis presented in Part II, the
resulting data structure allows to examine wages and wage differentials at a disaggregated
level. As the cohorts are tracked over time, it is also possible to describe a particular wage
path per cohort. Such wage paths might develop differently for young and old cohorts, for
example. Lining up cohort wages by age shows a particular pattern which can be split up
into several components. That way, it is possible to detect the contribution of age, year
of birth, and common shocks to the observed cohort-earnings curve.
12Similar problems may of course arise if the sample design is changed over time or if not all population
groups have the same probability of being selected into the sample (Deaton, 1997).
13On the other hand, in the context of measurement error grouped variables are recognised as an
instrument since averaging may reduce or cancel out measurement errors. The loss in efficiency would
then be smaller (Kennedy, 1998).
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Chapter 8
A Disaggregated Look at Wages and
Wage Differentials
8.1 Analysing Cohort Wages for African and White
Workers
The independent cross sectional data for the years 1995, 1997, and 1999 of the October
Household Survey are used to construct a synthetic panel. The variable of main interest is
(the logarithm of) the real hourly wage earned by full-time workers employed in the formal
sector.1 Aggregation could be based on measures of central tendency such as the mean
and median or particular percentiles. To ascertain, whether the data used here contain
extreme values, cohort averages were calculated applying both the mean and median of
real hourly wages. Cohorts are defined by gender, race, and age. The mean wage exceeded
the median wage in each cohort, indicating that the within cohort distribution of real
hourly wages is skewed to the right. In some cohorts few extreme individual values caused
the mean to deviate substantially from the median. These outliers were excluded and
the following analysis uses the arithmetic mean of the logarithm of real hourly wages as
cohort average.2
The definition of cohorts and corresponding cell sizes are reported in Tables 8.1 and
8.2. Aggregating individual data according to race and gender and applying a five-year
age band results in six cohorts per population group covering workers aged between 20
and 49 in 1995 (Table 8.1).3 For example, the first cohort pools all formal sector full-time
1See chapter 6.2 for a detailed description of the data preparation. The 1997 and 1999 wages were
deflated to the base year 1995 using the consumer price index (Stats SA, 2001b). Workers refer to people
working full-time in a formal sector job.
2The least differences between mean and median wages were found among White female workers,
whereas among White men aged 35 to 39 in 1995 seven outliers have been excluded. Regarding African
workers, real hourly wages are much more dispersed for both gender. Unreasonably high wages were found
in four cohorts and altogether nine observations of African workers were precluded from further analysis.
3The number of observations available for White women limits the analysis to these age groups.
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workers aged 20 to 24 in 1995. In 1999, workers at the age of 24 to 28 belong to this
cohort. For all population groups cohort sizes first increase with age, peak out at the
middle cohorts covering workers in their thirties in 1995, and decline thereafter again.
The greatest concessions regarding reasonable cell sizes had to be made for White female
workers, where the number of observations per cohort is sometimes less than 100. With
respect to African workers, cohort sizes are fairly large. To get a more detailed picture for
this race, a second set of cohorts has been constructed applying a two-year age band. As
shown in Table 8.2, this results in 14 cohorts available for analysis. Descriptive statistics
for African workers and the decomposition analysis are based upon these data.
Before turning to the results it should be pointed out explicitly that the following
analysis is more of a explorative nature. The synthetic panel is based on only three
subsequent cross sections and altogether, cohorts are followed over a time span of five years
only. The scope to observe for example different cohorts at the same age is thus rather
limited and the obtained results do not represent consolidated findings. Regardless of these
limitations, the analysis allows interesting insights and can at least hint to differences that
exist between different groups of workers.
8.1.1 Summary Statistics Based on Cohorts
Figure 8.1 gives a first look at the logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort for the different
population groups.4 Each connected line represents the mean wage for one cohort in
1995, 1997, and 1999. Wages earned by African male and female workers are given in the
upper panel. Since different cohorts are observed at the same age, lines do overlap. When
tracing the wage level across different cohorts it becomes obvious that wages increase
with age but at a decreasing rate. Among older cohorts of women mean wages even seem
to decline again.5 Facing the age-group specific averages of one year with the overall
mean in that period provides insights into the composition of the latter.6 For African
men, the comparison confirms what the graph had already suggested. In 1995, the mean
wages of the first three cohorts, which are incidentally among the lowest observed in
the sample, pull down the overall average to 1.73. Overall averages for the subsequent
years amount to circa 1.8 as the young cohorts realised considerable increases and older
cohorts enjoyed relatively stable earnings for the total time span. Regarding females, the
4In the following, wage refers to the logarithm of real wage earned per hour.
5Such concave age-earnings paths are discussed in relation to the theory of human capital. See chapter
8.2 for further discussion.
6I refrained from adding the overall means for the three years to the graphs to keep the pictures clear.
As averaging over all workers belonging to the same population group results in mean wages that are
very close to those presented in Part II, I refer also to Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
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rather heterogeneous picture of cohort wages is striking. To find out whether the various
within cohort changes are statistically significant they will be discussed separately. For
the moment, it suffices to note that African women had their highest overall mean wage
of about 1.83 in 1995 due to the relatively high earnings of the middle cohorts in that
year. As these cohorts suffered on average from considerable wage losses in the following
years, overall means dropped to 1.71 in 1997 and 1.67 in 1999, respectively.
The lower panel presents cohort wages for White male and female workers. Since for
this race the five-year interval has been applied, it is not possible to observe different
cohorts at the same age. For both gender the data point to higher wage levels as workers
belong to older cohorts. Regarding the total time span, men realised on average somewhat
bigger increases. Within cohort trends suggest that White women moved along a relatively
smooth path, while males had on average a particularly bad year in 1997. This impres-
sion is confirmed when considering the overall averages. In 1997, White men realised the
lowest mean of 3.03 and experienced average wages of about 3.15 in the adjacent years.
Only White women enjoyed on average constantly increasing wages as the overall mean
amounted to 2.73, 2.76, and 2.83 in 1995, 1997, and 1999.
Inspecting related socioeconomic characteristics from a cohort perspective is instruc-
tive as well. A detailed look on variables determining wage levels and employment propen-
sity is given in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 for African and White workers, respectively.7 The first
panel in Figure 8.2 shows the number of years of schooling completed by cohort, sepa-
rated for African men and women. The analysis based on aggregated data demonstrated
that the level of education was on average higher among African women employed in a
formal sector job than among African men working in this sector.8 With the exception
of the youngest cohort in 1999, this finding turns out to be consistent across all cohorts
considered here. Although the differences are rather volatile, the gap becomes somewhat
smaller for younger cohorts. Moving from younger to older cohorts, the number of school-
ing years follows a downward trend for both gender. One would expect older cohorts to be
less educated than younger ones, but the level of formal education within cohorts should
be relatively constant.9 Since the distinct decline for middle and older cohorts is also
revealed when looking at broader samples like labour force participants and working age
population, it cannot be attributed to an education-based selection out of formal sector
employment. It would appear that the decline might be due to the changing way of re-
porting educational levels, as discussed in chapter 4.2. This assumption, however, is not
7In the following, the focus will be on particular findings exposed only when examining cohort data.
For a general discussion of these variables as well as their relevance for finding employment and wage
setting, see chapter 6.
8Results presented in Part II are in the following also referred to as derived from the analysis of the
aggregated data.
9It may of course vary in a random way, as every year different individuals are grouped together.
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confirmed when turning to White workers (Figure 8.3, first panel). Here, within cohort
educational levels do not indicate any particular trend and also across cohorts changes
only happen on a small scale.
Following the number of children living in the workers’ household across cohorts points
to different patterns for Africans and Whites (Figures 8.2 and 8.3, second panel). For the
latter the number of children at first increases with age, reaches its maximum around the
age of 35-40, and decreases thereafter. Although the observations for African workers are
noisier, it becomes clear that there is no such inverted U relationship between age and
the number of children living in the household.10 A maximum number can still be made
out for both gender, but a downward trend is discernable for females only. This decline,
however, comes to an end as women grow older and finally turns back into an increase.11
Adapting results of Klasen and Woolard (2000), who examine household formation in
the context of unemployment, the re-increasing number of children might be related to a
better access to resources when being attached to a worker’s household.
The last panel in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 shows for each cohort the proportion of co-
hort members acting as head of household. Regarding men, this proportion is steadily
increasing both within and between cohorts and comes close to 100 per cent for the oldest
cohorts. Within single cohorts of African women the share also rises considerably between
1995 and 1999. The proportion of household heads among African female workers aged
44 and above in 1995 lies between 40 and 60 per cent. Among White peers the share is
only half as much.
This last example especially points out advantages when working with synthetic panel
data. Summary statistics obtained from the cross sections already indicated that the
proportion of female headed household among workers is nearly twice as high for Africans
than for Whites. Considering various age groups at one particular year would have revealed
differences existing between younger and older individuals. In the absence of individual
panel data, only cohort data constructed from a time series of cross sections facilitate to
study also temporal developments within particular age groups.
8.1.2 Cohort Specific Wage Differentials
When working with the aggregated data, differences in mean wages between groups of
workers (holding either sex or race constant) were already discussed. To summarise briefly,
10According to the data, the number of children living in African households peaked in almost every
cohort in 1997. It is, however, hard to tell what year(s) might have caused this somewhat peculiar finding.
11Admittedly, this course is hardly visible when looking at the graph based on the workers’ sample,
but shows up a lot clearer when viewing for example labour force participants.
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racial gaps were substantially larger than gender gaps in all three years. Individual pro-
ductivity determining differences could only partly explain the observed differences. Re-
garding the development of overall wage gaps over time, both narrowing and widening
tendencies could be observed, depending on what population groups are considered. The
way the data are prepared now allows to break down some of these findings to the level
of cohorts.12
The upper panel of Figure 8.4 plots cohort wages for White and African men, the
lower panel cohort wages for female workers of both races.13 The racial wage hierarchy
observed when examining the aggregated data continues at the disaggregated level: cohort
wages for White workers are always above the level of the corresponding African cohorts.
Comparing the upper and lower panel of Figure 8.4, the gaps emerging between cohort
wages of male workers are always larger than those that exist between female workers.
Within cohort wages develop quite differently over time and will be examined separately in
the next section. Abstracting from within cohort variation, cohort earnings of White and
African men follow similar paths as workers age. As a result, the gap between the wages
of younger cohorts is commensurable to the one appearing for older cohorts. Regarding
females, the racial gap between cohort wages tend to get larger among older cohorts.
But this tendency turns out to be not statistically significant, as the confidence intervals
become larger for these group of workers.
Figure 8.5 shows similar graphs for cohort specific wage differentials between male
and female workers holding race constant. The gaps shown here are substantially smaller
than the racial differences just presented. Focussing African workers depicted in the upper
panel, the overall evolution of wages across cohorts is rather similar, except for the oldest
cohort. The wage gap between men and women aged 45-49 in 1995 broadens noticeably
and becomes finally significant in a statistical sense in 1999. Going back to 1995, the
examination of the aggregated data unearthed the peculiar result that wages earned by
African females are on average higher than wages of African men. The breakdown into
several age groups reveals that especially younger cohorts contribute to this finding. But
even if overlapping confidence bands indicate that in nearly all cases the negative wage
differential is not statistically significant it remains an unusual outcome.
As regards White workers, the majority of cohort specific gender wage differentials
turns out to be statistically significant. Looking at younger cohorts of both gender, they
however experience comparable wage levels as well as growth rates resulting in only small
12Wage regressions and decompositions comparable to those presented in chapter 6 could not be per-
formed as the number of observations in the synthetic panel is too small. Furthermore, variables used in
panel estimations should exhibit a certain degree of random variation over time. However, regressors like
the level of formal education and age either do not change over time or vary in a systematic way.
13To compare the same birth cohorts of African and White workers, cohorts for the former are now
also based on the five-year age band.
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and mostly not significant wage differences. Among workers who are in their thirties in
1995 the gender wage gap increases considerably, as female wages now diverge substan-
tially from the men’s wage level. Relating this finding to the discussion on the number
of children living in the workers’ household suggests that on average women at this age
cut back their labour market activities to raise children. Moving on to older cohorts the
gender gap narrows and becomes statistically insignificant again, as men’s wages do on
average no longer experience positive growth rates but approach the wage level of women.
To conclude this part of the analysis, it should be emphasised again that wage differen-
tials observed between groups of workers do not automatically point to unequal treatment
in the sense of discrimination. As shown in chapter 6, the unexplained portion of wage
gaps when averaging over all age groups sometimes assumes alarming proportions and
we would expect to see a similar pattern at a disaggregated level. Splitting the workers
sample into several age cohorts reveals that cohort specific gaps are relatively constant
across cohorts or increase and decrease as workers age. The question then arises, whether
similar gaps between age cohorts, as those between White and African men, correspond to
similar unexplained components or rather mask changing magnitudes of the explainable
and unexplainable portions of the wage gaps. For reasons mentioned before this question
must remain open so far.
8.1.3 The Dynamics of Cohort Wages
The structure of the synthetic panel explicitly allows to follow cohorts over time. Although
the discussion in previous sections already mentioned wage growth within particular birth
cohorts, it will be addressed in detail now to see whether for example young and old
cohorts differ in their experienced earnings mobility. As only three points in time covering
a total time span of five years are considered, the analysis of within cohort growth will be
restricted to a rather short period, but can still point to different tendencies for different
cohorts.
Figure 8.4 plots cohort wages for all four groups of workers without intersection. Solid
lines in the first graph represent cohort wages for White men, that group of workers
who earned on average the highest wage at any given age. When considering the total
time span, only the youngest cohort realised a wage increase that also turns out to be
statistically significant. Moreover, the gain is in absolute numbers the biggest observed
for the total sample. As indicated by the confidence intervals, White male workers aged
between 25 and 34 in 1995 experienced relatively stable earnings, in contrast to older
cohorts who on average realised losses in real wages between 1995 and 1999.14
14The 95 per cent confidence bands for the last two cohorts do slightly overlap. But the difference
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Only middle and older cohorts among African female workers had to bear similar or
even larger declines in earnings in absolute (log) terms (see dashed lines in the lower panel).
The already received impression of a very heterogeneous group of workers continues when
looking at within cohort changes. Cohort wages jump up and down quite considerably.
As regards the youngest cohort this results in no significant trend for the total period. It
is thus the only population group of workers aged 20 to 24 in 1995 that cannot realise
significant wage increases over the total time span covered here.15
Within cohort changes of the two remaining groups of workers follow similar patterns.
The first two and three cohorts of African men and White women respectively enjoy signif-
icant wage increases between 1995 and 1999. Regarding older cohorts, the first impression
gained from the descriptives in Figure 8.1 is confirmed: wages within cohorts remained
relatively constant for the period considered. Concerning White women, however, the in-
significance of wage differences might partly be due to increasing variance as the number
of observations per cohort becomes very small.
Already the limited time frame of five years clearly shows that within cohort wages
develop differently for younger and older workers belonging to the same population group.
Younger cohorts did realise statistically significant wage increases, except for African
women, whereas older cohorts either faced relatively unchanged wage levels or had to
cope with real wage losses. Comparing within cohort growth of workers who belong to
different groups of the population the analysis suggests that cohorts of young White
workers benefitted most from wage increases. Unlike African women, who on average
were found to be in an inferior situation, as young cohorts did not realise wage increases
but already middle aged workers suffered from declining mean wages.16 However, to yield
consolidated findings on within cohort trends, a greater number of periods T is needed.
8.2 Determining Age, Cohort and Year Effects
8.2.1 General Remarks
Economic theory suggests for a variety of (socio-)economic quantities a particular pattern
evolving over an individual’s working life or total life time. For example, Modigliani’s
life cycle hypothesis of saving argues that individuals, while working, will save a certain
between 1995 and 1999 for the two oldest cohorts of White male workers as well as similar marginal cases
among other population groups are significant at an interval of 10 per cent.
15This rather pessimistic result persists when examining cohorts defined by the two-year age interval.
Then, the first three cohorts do not experience significant wage changes between 1995 and 1999.
16This does of course not imply that once contemporarily young cohorts are aged they will pass through
the same path of wages as the one described for currently old cohorts. See also the next section.
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fraction of their income thereby accumulating wealth which is continuously reduced once
they are retired. As a result, the relationship between age and wealth will be humped-
shaped (Modigliani, 1986). As economies grow, variables like savings, incomes, and wealth
are also subject to secular trends. Alongside economic development savings and incomes
are growing, whereas for example household sizes tend to decline (Deaton, 1997). In the
absence of longitudinal data synthetic panel data have been frequently used to verify
various age-related profiles and to disentangle the age effect from the generational or
cohort effect.17
The relation between age and earnings also follows a distinct pattern. Young workers
start with relatively low wages but the average wage level increases as workers grow older.
Since the increases diminish over time the overall curve turns out to be concave. A the-
oretical framework is given by the human capital model (see for example Becker, 1993;
Mincer, 1962).18 The model designs a particular wage path over the working life cycle of
individuals. Empirical tests whether concave age-earnings profiles exist are ideally based
on longitudinal data. Profiles derived from cross sectional data can appear differently be-
cause of secular trends toward higher education and occupational or life-cycle employment
changes, for example.19 Unless such cohort effects can be neglected or do not exist, as in
case of a stationary economy, age-earnings profiles obtained from time series and cross
sectional data are identical (Becker, 1993).
Table 8.3 brings together real hourly wages (now not in log form) for various groups of
workers at two different points in time. To be able to compare the income of a particular
age group in 1995 with the appropriate cohort’s income in 1999, a four-year age interval
has been chosen. The cross sectional profiles for all groups of workers are humped-shaped:
wages first rise with age, reach a maximum, and decline thereafter. Looking at the data this
way also suggests that highly skilled workers realise their maximum earnings later than less
skilled workers as the peak in earnings for Africans, who on average work in occupations
requiring less skills, happens at an earlier age than for Whites. However, the underlying
statistic is not appropriate for such conclusion. Cross sectional data observe workers of
17For example, Jappelli (1999) tested the age-wealth profile for Italy, Deaton and Paxson (1994b)
examined levels of income, consumption, and saving in Taiwan using cohort data. Pseudo panels have
also been used to study the relation between consumption inequality and age in the UK, USA, Taiwan,
and Japan (Attanasio, Berloffa, Blundell, and Preston, 2002; Ohtake and Saito, 1998; Deaton and Paxson,
1994a).
18According to the theory, differences in earnings (and other labour market outcomes) can be explained
by different amounts of human capital. Individuals want to maximise their life time income which is,
among other things, subject to the level of human capital acquired. By choosing an optimal amount of
both formal education and on-the-job training workers can increase their productivity and maximise their
earnings (see also Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998).
19For a brief review of analyses either based on cross sectional or longitudinal data conducted in the
fields of labour economics and forensic economics see for example Gohmann, McCrickard, and Slesnick
(1998) and Rodgers, Brookshire, and Thornton (1996).
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different age at one point in time and the resulting age-earnings profile is composed of
wages earned by people with different life time earnings. Therefore, the earlier peak for
less skilled workers might be a similarly wrong implication as the frequently referred
to overstated downturn in earnings for older workers because cohort effects operating
towards higher life time incomes for younger workers (regardless the educational or skill
level) cannot be taken into account when analysing single cross sections (Deaton, 1997;
Becker, 1993).
Turning again to Table 8.3 and comparing the cohorts’ income in 1999 with the cross
sectional income of the corresponding age group in 1995 makes clear that the two ap-
proaches yield different results. But only among older cohorts of White female workers
does the cross sectional profile show a more pronounced downturn in earnings. Group spe-
cific wages of other workers in 1995 are either similar to or even above the corresponding
cohort level in 1999. This somewhat surprising result suggests two things: firstly, as dif-
ferences between cross sectional and cohort data exist it is important to take generational
trends into account and secondly, those trends might be different from the expectation.
A third component that can be identified when decomposing earnings is a time effect
which captures macroeconomic shocks affecting all cohorts in the same way. Equation
(8.1) illustrates the functional form of such a decomposition.20
Ȳct = α + agect + cohortc + timet + uct, c = 1, ..., C, t = 1, ..., T. (8.1)
The average of the logarithm of real hourly wages of cohort c at time t, Ȳct, can be
separated into an age effect reflecting the typical profile evolving as workers grow older, a
cohort effect mirroring secular trends, and a time effect absorbing aggregate shocks as for
example business cycle effects (Deaton, 1997). Age control variables are easily specified,
cohorts can be conveniently labelled by age at time t = 1, and year dummies are often
implemented to pick up time effects. Equation (8.1) rules out any interaction between
the single components thereby assuming the same age profile for all cohorts.21 The cohort
effect then indicates different positions of that age profile. If variables controlling for age,
cohort, and time effects enter equation (8.1) in an unrestricted way, this will lead to
an identification problem because of the linear relation between these three effects. For
example, as soon as age and year are given, the corresponding cohort (defined by year of
birth) is known as well and it is not possible to identify all effects simultaneously.
20As it will be applied here, the decomposition is used as an descriptive device only. Regarding work
on savings, consumption or wealth the decomposition into age, cohort, and time effects also allows to
validate economic models, for example the life cycle hypothesis (e.g. Attanasio, 1997).
21In principle, it would be possible to include interaction terms to allow, for example, in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks younger cohorts to adjust savings differently than older ones (e.g. Attanasio
and Weber, 1994). However, such extensions are not followed up here because, given the small size of the
synthetic panel, the number of right-hand side variables should be kept at a minimum.
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There are several ways to overcome this problem. If one is willing to assume certainty,
which in turn means no unexpected common shocks, there is no need to include any
control variables with respect to time.22 Many applied papers, however, take the existence
of macroeconomic influences into account and impose an additional restriction. Following
Deaton and Paxson (1994b), all trends observable in the data can be attributed to age
and cohort effects, if one assumes that the time effect has a zero mean and is not following
any trend.23 In the context discussed here, it seems reasonable to ascribe wage increases
to age and cohort effects and to assume that cyclical fluctuations are zero in the long-
run (Deaton, 1997). Studies decomposing earnings (e.g. Johnson and Stafford, 1974),
savings (e.g. Kitamura, 2001; Jappelli and Modigliani, 1998), or consumption profiles (e.g.
Bardazzi, 2000; Ohtake and Saito, 1998) applied this normalisation strategy or adopted
slightly modified versions (e.g. Jappelli, 1999).24
8.2.2 Decomposing the Earnings of Africans
In the following, average earnings for the cohorts of African female and male workers
shown in Table 8.2 will be subject to a decomposition into age, cohort, and year effects.25
However, it should be pointed out from the beginning that this empirical investigation
will probably encounter difficulties. As only three survey years are used to construct
the synthetic panel and furthermore a two-year age interval has been chosen, successive
cohorts are observed at the same age for a short period only. Thus, overlapping is extremely
limited and it will be hard to distinguish between trends and transitory shocks (Deaton,
1997). Obtained results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.
The upper limit of each age interval specifies the age variable.26 Cohorts are consec-
utively numbered so that higher numbers correspond to older cohorts. One year dummy
has to be redefined that time effects average to zero and are orthogonal to any trends.
All observations have been weighted by the square root of cohort sizes
√
nc to accom-
modate the heteroscedastic nature of the aggregated data. Earnings can be regressed on
both polynomials and a set of dummy variables. Table 8.4 shows the estimation results
22That way, one would also forgo to capture any non-random influences not correlated with age or
cohort, like measurement errors (Jappelli, 1999).
23To model orthogonality and zero mean, the standard year dummies timet have to be redefined to
equal the following expression: time∗t = timet − [(t − 1)time2 − (t − 2)time1]. Finally, only T − 2 year
dummies enter the regression to facilitate identification (Deaton, 1997; Deaton and Paxson, 1994a).
24A general discussion on normalisation and associated pitfalls can be found in Heckman and Robb
(1985) who conclude ”the real problem is finding [...] better explanatory variables and sharper behavioral
models” (Heckman and Robb, 1985, p. 148).
25Since for Whites different cohorts are never observed at the same age, it is not possible to decompose
the earnings of these workers in a similar way.
26Again, this labelling has been chosen for the sake of convenience.
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separated for African men and women. Columns labelled by (1) show the specification
which fitted the data of male and female workers best under the consideration that the
number of the remaining degrees of freedom is still acceptable. Regarding men, age and
cohort polynomials are included, while for women, a combination of a third-order age
polynomial and cohort dummy variables was chosen.27
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 provide a graphical illustration of the estimated effects according
to specification (1). The top right-hand panels display the time effect that has been
calculated from the restricted year dummy. Only for men, the coefficient is significant
but compared to the other effects only small in magnitude. Given the short time span
covered, it is difficult to interpret the time effect in its theoretical sense of capturing long
term, aggregated shocks. But it suggests that in 1995 wages were on average higher even
though age and cohort effects were controlled for.28
The bottom panels show age and cohort effects. Although the relationship between
earnings and age is humped-shaped for both gender, the exact shape differs consider-
ably between the two. Still appropriate for both groups, average wages peak around a
relatively early age of thirty.29 The men’s profile increases steeply at first and declines
moderately after the maximum. By contrast, the upward trend of the females’ age effect
is less pronounced among young workers, but as women grow older they face a sizable
downturn in earnings. Wages realised by female workers aged forty correspond on average
to those observed for the youngest. With advancing age the drop in earnings continues.
This substantial downward trend is partly offset by cohort effects that are increasing with
cohort age. Contrary to the theory outlined above, ’secular trends’ are in favour of older
cohorts. As regards men, the estimation result is less controversial since no significant
cohort effect could be determined. As mentioned before, the short time span may hamper
a correct separation of short term deviations and long term trends. Otherwise, the theo-
retical argument that generational effects are in support of younger cohorts also hinges on
the economy’s growth rate (Becker, 1993). For the period 1985-1999, the average annual
growth rate of South Africa’s GDP per capita amounted to -1.0 per cent (WDI, 2002).
Therefore, we no longer would expect to see cohort effects favouring younger workers.
In addition, if incumbent workers would not suffer from wage reduction given high and
rising levels of unemployment, but young entrants had to agree upon lower initial pay-
ments, this could culminate in a positive cohort effect. This hypothesis, however, can be
27In all specifications both dummy variables and polynomials of different orders were tested to control
for age and cohort. Both approaches yielded similar results and thus statistical parameters were decisive
(i.e. R squared, degrees of freedom left, t-statistics, F-Tests).
28Specifications using normal year dummies but leaving out either age or cohort controls confirm this
interpretation.
29Please note that the dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. Running the decomposition on
antilog values leads to later peaks for both groups. However, all control variables for age and cohort in
the female specification become insignificant.
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backed up only partially. Studies analysing the long term trend of African real wages in
the formal sector document a certain rigidity of mean wages despite rising unemployment
(e.g. Fedderke and Mariotti, 2002; Fallon and Lucas, 1998).30 But whether young and
older cohorts of workers contributed differently to this outcome is hard to answer as entry
wages or wage levels by age groups could not be found.
The regression results prove to be relatively insensitive to modifications of the model.
In specification (2) a control variable for educational attainment has been added. Figures
8.8 and 8.9 illustrate the results. In accordance with the theory of human capital, higher
levels of formal education result in higher wages. For both gender, the age effect follows a
compressed but similar path to the one obtained in the previous estimation.31 The positive
correlation between average wages and age in 1995 as a cohort measure still prevails for
women and becomes slightly significant for men as well.
The last specification shown here relaxes the assumption of appropriate cohort sizes
and considers all workers aged between 15 and 60 in 1995. That way, it is possible to
check whether the results are driven by the chosen age span ignoring older workers in
particular. But again, the overall picture does not change much (see also Figures 8.10
and 8.11). The age profile for men is concave, for women it is clearly humped-shaped.
Almost all dummy variables controlling for different cohorts of women have positive and
significant coefficients. For men, the effect becomes insignificant again.32
An assessment of the results obtained here turns out to be difficult since studies
addressing similar questions about cohort wages in the South African labour market
could not be found. There is some literature on earnings and household income mobility
of Africans using the KIDS panel data (see for example Cichello, Fields, and Leibbrandt,
2002; Klasen and Woolard, 2002). Both studies conclude that in KwaZulu-Natal mobility
between 1993 and 1998 was high and that changes in labour market status as well as
movements between the formal and informal sector largely contributed to this. However,
given the relatively small sample size and the fact that individuals were interviewed only
twice, a cohort analysis with this data could hardly be more instructive.
The number of periods T is crucial in any cohort analysis as it determines for how
long cohorts can be followed over time and thus how many cohorts are observed at the
same age. The previous analysis tracked cohorts over the short period of five years. It
thereby only allows a direct comparison between the average wage of a given cohort with
30Fallon and Lucas (1998) conclude that other factors (e.g. African trade unionism) counteracted the
exerted downward pressure on wages arising from high unemployment rates.
31This also fits in with the human capital theory which predicts steeper and more concave profiles for
better educated individuals (Becker, 1993).
32Cohort wages were also regressed on either only age or cohort control variables. Depending on the
order of the polynomial, concave or humped-shaped cohort effects could be identified but never constantly
declining ones. Age effects developed similarly when used as the only regressor.
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mean wages for somewhat younger or older workers. In other words, although belonging to
different birth cohorts the particular groups of workers might not really have encountered
different secular trends that could in turn be detected by any decomposition. To identify
such effects it is necessary to follow cohorts over an extended period of time. Only then,
the observed paths may non-randomly differ and a decomposition can reveal to what
extent age and cohort effects have contributed to this outcome.
8.3 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this work was to go beyond a review of average earnings by population group in
South Africa. Following Deaton (1985), I used three successive cross sections to construct
a synthetic panel, with cohort means of African and White workers in formal employment
replacing individual observations. The average wage per cohort was calculated to examine
earnings at a disaggregated level. Preparing the data in that way enables a better utilisa-
tion of individual information provided by the October Household Surveys as well as to
study changes over time.
The breakdown of overall mean wages into several age groups demonstrated that
African women form the most heterogeneous group. Wages varied considerably between
workers of different age but also when tracing single cohorts over time. Unlike White
women, who on average experienced only small scale wage changes both across and within
cohorts. In a similar way, cohort specific wage differentials were looked at. The interest was
to see whether or not the gaps emerging between cohorts of different population groups
remained relatively constant when moving from younger to older cohorts. Especially the
comparisons by gender pointed to changing magnitudes of the differentials. Regarding
Africans, cohort wages seem to diverge for older workers whereas in case of Whites the
greatest discrepancies between male and female cohort wages were found among middle-
aged workers.
As cohorts are followed over time it was also possible to have a closer look at within
cohort changes. Although the time period of five years is rather short, different trends
for younger and older cohorts could still be detected and were in most cases as expected.
Young cohorts realised statistically significant wage increases, except for African women.
Older cohorts, instead, either faced relatively unchanged wage levels or encountered on
average a wage loss.
The limited number of periods became again crucial to the last analysis. Earnings of
Africans were decomposed into age, cohort and year effects to separate life-cycle from
generational effects. In the present setup, different cohorts are observed at the same age
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for a very short period only, causing difficulties as transitory shocks are hard to distin-
guish from long term trends. Especially the estimated cohort effect of African females is
highly controversial as it suggests that older cohorts benefitted from generational trends.
Although some features of formal sector employment in South Africa as well as the per-
formance of the overall economy seem to be in line with this (constant or increasing real
wages despite rising unemployment, low entrance rates, stagnating economy), an increase
in the number of periods is compulsory to arrive at assured results.
With a time series of cross sections available, the construction of cohorts which in
turn can be used to synthesise a panel structure provides a good opportunity to address
temporal developments also in the absence of genuine panel data. The last decade has seen
the development of consistent estimators for static as well as dynamic models. A recent
study by Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2003) tackles one of the remaining short-comings
of cohort data, namely that within single cohorts an equal distribution had still to be
assumed. Quantile regressions explicitly take into account the movement of the entire
distribution which finally allows to use all the variation of the individual data for the
estimation.
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Table 8.1: Cohort Definition and Cohort Size: Five-Year Age Band
No. of Age in Men Women
Cohorts 1995 1995 1997 1999 1995 1997 1999
Africans
1 20-24 462 594 647 222 313 352
2 25-29 1029 989 931 508 570 503
3 30-34 1185 1165 989 551 632 529
4 35-39 1232 1050 799 565 583 472
5 40-44 939 762 588 377 408 286
6 45-49 807 591 392 322 292 206
Whites
1 20-24 173 156 129 163 142 119
2 25-29 218 172 154 172 131 129
3 30-34 278 203 165 174 118 95
4 35-39 289 183 127 171 120 91
5 40-44 248 144 103 139 109 88
6 45-49 217 157 88 124 89 67
Table 8.2: Cohort Definition and Cohort Size: Two-Year Age Band
No. of Age in Men Women
Cohorts 1995 1995 1997 1999 1995 1997 1999
Africans
1 21-22 162 232 233 70 108 145
2 23-24 257 273 325 120 165 140
3 25-26 356 363 389 194 215 223
4 27-28 457 419 349 208 250 198
5 29-30 502 456 388 242 247 177
6 31-32 453 481 399 222 236 219
7 33-34 446 435 395 193 254 215
8 35-36 558 451 359 255 241 204
9 37-38 465 438 309 232 238 197
10 39-40 507 342 236 171 195 134
11 41-42 338 306 257 147 158 137
12 43-44 301 275 226 137 159 86
13 45-46 415 279 193 166 139 115
14 47-48 260 226 134 110 111 64
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Table 8.3: Real Hourly Mean Wage by Cohort, 1995 and 1999
Age in Wage of Cohort in
1995 1999 1995 1999
African Men
24-27 28-31 7.32 8.25
28-31 32-35 8.50 8.19
32-35 36-39 9.02 10.66
36-39 40-43 9.23 10.47
40-43 44-47 9.91 9.40
44-47 48-51 9.14 8.93
48-51 52-55 9.53 8.13
52-55 56-59 8.94 7.91
African Women
24-27 28-31 7.98 8.58
28-31 32-35 9.05 9.52
32-35 36-39 10.14 10.06
36-39 40-43 10.11 11.30
40-43 44-47 9.59 8.60
44-47 48-51 9.28 8.99
48-51 52-55 8.58 7.82
52-55 56-59 7.99 7.54
White Men
24-27 28-31 20.81 27.02
28-31 32-35 26.23 33.14
32-35 36-39 31.83 34.32
36-39 40-43 32.98 32.39
40-43 44-47 34.32 32.56
44-47 48-51 41.67 33.05
48-51 52-55 35.77 35.24
52-55 56-59 37.35 35.87
White Women
24-27 28-31 15.39 18.88
28-31 32-35 18.04 24.87
32-35 36-39 16.11 20.54
36-39 40-43 19.99 19.85
40-43 44-47 21.24 22.62
44-47 48-51 20.57 23.50
48-51 52-55 20.06 20.10
52-55 56-59 17.98 23.27
Numbers shown are sample weighted means
(1995 prices).
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Table 8.4: continued
African Men African Women
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
49-50 - - - - - 2.15∗∗ (0.33)
51-52 - - - - - 2.24∗∗ (0.34)
53-54 - - - - - 2.29∗∗ (0.35)
55-56 - - - - - 2.33∗∗ (0.38)
57-58 - - - - - 2.54∗∗ (0.41)
59-60 - - - - - 2.59∗∗ (0.45)
Year
1999 -0.02∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02∗ (0.01)
N 42 42 69 42 42 69
R2 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99
Significance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parentheses.
Cohort dummy variables correspond to the age in 1995. Reference categories: Specifications (1), (2): Cohort 20-21, Specification (3): Cohort 15-16.
Education is measured in years of schooling completed.
Variables Age3, Age4, Cohort2, and Cohort3 have been scaled by 10−2.
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Figure 8.1: Logarithm of Real Hourly Wage (1995 prices) by Cohort
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(a) African workers.
 
 
 log_rw_24  log_rw_29
 log_rw_34  log_rw_39
Men
24 29 34 39 44 49 54
0
.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Women
24 29 34 39 44 49 54
(b) White workers.
Notes: Figures are based on sample weighted cohort means. The x-axis in each graph is labelled ac-
cording to the upper age limit of the individual cohorts. (This labelling has been chosen for the sake of
convenience.)
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Figure 8.2: Summary Statistics by Cohort, African Workers
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(a) Number of years of schooling completed.
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(b) Number of children living in the worker’s household.
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(c) Proportion of workers acting as household head.
Notes: See Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.3: Summary Statistics by Cohort, White Workers
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(a) Number of years of schooling completed.
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(b) Number of children living in the worker’s household.
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(c) Proportion of workers acting as household head.
Notes: See Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.4: Racial Wage Differentials by Cohort
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Notes: See Figure 8.1. Solid lines correspond to cohort wages of White workers, dashed lines to those of
African workers. Cohort wages are enclosed by confidence bands of 95 per cent.
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Figure 8.5: Gender Wage Differentials by Cohort
Africans
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Notes: See Figure 8.1. Solid lines correspond to cohort wages of male workers, dashed lines to those of
female workers. Cohort wages are enclosed by confidence bands of 95 per cent.
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Figure 8.6: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Men (1)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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Figure 8.7: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Women (1)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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Figure 8.8: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Men (2)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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Figure 8.9: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Women (2)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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Figure 8.10: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Men (3)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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Figure 8.11: Age, Cohort, and Year Effects of Wages Earned by African Women (3)
Logarithm of real hourly wage by cohort
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